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ENCLAVE DISTRICTING
Henry L. Chambers, Jr.'
Congressional districting has historically fostered single-member,
geographically compact districts consisting ofcontiguous territory and has resulted
in common representation for those who live near each other. Underlying compact
districting is the assumption that people living relatively close together share
political interests that can be adequately served by common representation. When
the United States was a sparsely populated agrarian nation and only the propertied
were the enfranchised, providing common representation based on residential
proximity was sensible. Over time, however, the connection between residence and
political interests has diminished.
In the wake ofthe Supreme Court's suggestion that representation shouldfocus
on people rather than land, some have suggested that states should attempt interestbased districting in which citizens with common political interests are provided
common representation. Professor Chambers follows in that tradition by positing
enclave districting. Enclave districting is an interest-based system that divides land
into demographically similar enclaves that can be aggregated to create
congressional districts with internally consistent demographic profiles. The
resulting districts would be structured around the political interests the state
perceives to be important and the political interests around which citizens vote.
Consequently, enclave districting would allow states flexibility in districting while
also potentially providing more effective representation for citizens.

* * *
INTRODUCTION

Since the earliest days of the Union, states have constructed congressional
districts.' That tradition has yielded single-member, compact districts consisting of
• Associate Professor, University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law; B.A., J.D.,
University of Virginia. I wish to thank the University of Missouri Law School Foundation
for providing support for this Article throughout its preparation. Additional thanks go to
Professors Tracey George, Christopher Guthrie, Robert Lawless, Evan Lee, Daryl Levinson,
Michael Middleton, and Robert Pushaw for their valuable comments on earlier drafts of this
work. Thanks also go to my research assistants, William Fritzlen and Elizabeth Meyer, who
provided much more than research assistance. Lastly, special thanks go to my wife, my
daughter, and the rest of my family.
1
Congress first required congressional districting in 1842. See Reapportionment Act
of 1842, ch. 47, 5 Stat. 491. By that time, only a handful of states elected members of
Congress through at-large voting, although commentators are unclear on precisely how
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contiguous territory. Such districting has been sensible, as land has been historically
viewed as the foundation for representation. 2 Particular pieces of land, whether in
the form of states, counties, cities, or towns, have been provided representation. 3
However, in the last thirty-five years, the Supreme Court has shifted the focus of
representation away from land and toward voters and their political interests.4 Rather
than focusing on whether a piece ofland should have representation, the question has
become what representation is appropriate for the people who live on the piece of
land.s Nonetheless, the stewards of the current land-centered system of districting
have not changed our congressional districting system accordingly. Whether this
stasis is problematic depends on how well voters' interests are represented under the
current system. The land-centered approach, focusing on compactness and

many states used districting and how many used at-large systems. See ROBERT G. DIXON,
JR., DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND POLITICS 59 n.2
(1968) (stating that by 1842 all but six states elected representatives by districts); Richard
H. Pildes & Kristen A. Donoghue, Cumulative Voting in the United States, 1995 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 241,253 n.46 ("By the time of[Reapportionment] Act [of 1842], nine states still
used at-large elections.").
2
Representation has many different meanings. See A.H. BIRCH, REPRESENTATION 15
(1971) (suggesting three non-political usages of term "representative": "(I) to denote an
agent or spokesman who acts on behalf of his principal; (2) to indicate that a person shares
some of the characteristics of a class of persons; [and] (3) to indicate that a person
symbolizes the identity or qualities of a class of persons"); Daniel Walker Howe, AntiFederalist/Federalist Dialogue and its Implications for Constitutional Understanding, 84
Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 4 {1989) ("We employ the Federalist model of representation when we
say that a lawyer 'represents' a client; but we are using the Anti-Federalist model when we
say that a jury should be 'representative' of the community."); Hanna Fenichel Pitkin,
Introduction to REPRESENTATION 6-17 (Hanna F. Pitkin ed., 1969) (suggesting that there
are many different definitions of representation). Each different notion of representation
denotes some relationship, abstract or concrete, between the representative and the
represented. What that relationship is or how it is defined determines how and how well the
representative represents the represented. See Pitkin, supra, at 17 (stating that a
representative has been described variously as "an actor, an agent, an ambassador, an
attorney, a commissioner, a delegate, a deputy, an emissary, an envoy, a factor, a guardian,
a lieutenant, a proctor, a procurator, a proxy, a steward, a substitute, a trustee, a tutor, and
a vicar").
3
While the land was not literally represented; the importance of the representational
interests of all of those living on the land was not always the primary concern in districting.
Of course, in other electoral systems, the land is almost literally represented. See infra note
71.
4
See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-68 (1964) (noting that representatives
represent people rather than land).
s Indeed, in some cases, the question is how a districting plan can affect the rights of
particular voters. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (ruling that the method of placing
voters in a particular district can violate their equal protection rights).
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contiguousness, protects the representational interests of voters to an extent, but not
as well as possible. The system is not broken, but it can be improved.
Districting is the process of grouping things-be they pieces of land or
collections of people-in order to provide the group with common representation. 6
Congressional districting is no different.- Traditional single-member districting
apportions tracts of land and provides inhabitants of those tracts with common
representation. While districting has followed this pattern since the early days of the
United States, the implications of districting have changed as the makeup of the
electorate and society's notions of representation have changed. As the nature of
representation changes, so should the nature and goals of apportionment.
In early America, congressional representatives were chosen by a relatively small
portion of the citizenry.' The prevailing view of government was that only those
people who owned some significant amount of property were possessed of sufficient
interest in the government's workings to affect those workings through voting. 8 The
right to vote was accordingly limited to those people. 9 Because the effective
electorate was so small, the broader political interests of the populace did not factor
into congressional representation or the districting structure. Quite simply, the will
of the people was not the primary concern of the voting process. While a small group
of electors voted on behalf ofthe populace, they were not required to vote with the
interests of the populace in mind. 10 Even if such a requirement had existed, it is
unclear how it would have been enforced.
6

See Pamela S. Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson, Why Voting Is Different, 84 CAL. L. REV.
1201, 1204 (1996) ("The very purpose of apportionment is to aggregate voters into groups
for the purpose of electing representatives.").
7
The Constitution does not require that members of Congress be chosen by a state's
entire population. Rather, it requires only that those who could elect the most numerous
branch of the state legislature also be allowed to elect members of Congress. See U.S.
CONST. art. I,§ 2. Today, those who can elect representatives to the most numerous branch
of a state legislature constitute the entire voting age population, excluding those who have
lost the right to vote for specific reasons. Such was not the case when the Constitution was
ratified. See infra note 130.
8
See generally JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS (1992) (positing that the federal
government was formed in large part to protect private property).
9
See infra notes 130-43 and accompanying text.
10
While representative government produces representatives who can advance the
public interest, it is unclear that individual voters vote in the public interest, rather than
based on self-interest. See Cheryl D. Block, Truth and Probability-Ironies in the Evolution
of Social Choice Theory, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 975, 1001 (1998) (contrasting public choice
theory's focus on self-interest and republican theory's focus on the possibility of voting
based on public interest). See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, The State of Madison's
Vision of the State: A Public Choice Perspective, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1328 (1994)
(discussing Madison's views with respect to the tension between voting based on public
interest and voting based on self-interest).
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Given the small effective electorate and the meager attention given to the broader
political interests of society at large, concern regarding whether districting led to the
representation of land in the abstract or of the people living on the land could be
regarded as mispla~ed. If the interests of the greater populace were not directly
factored into voting, whether districting adequately protected their interests hardly
mattered. However, even as the percentage ofthe population with the power to vote
expanded, congressional districting explicitly continued to follow geography. 11 Landcentered compact districting continued to make sense because it focused broadly on
land and property, insofar as it continued to provide common representation for those
who lived near each other. In a predominantly agrarian and sparsely populated
society, that style of districting was reasonable. Land continued t6 be the basic unit
of representation because it still fit as the basic unit of apportionment.
During the middle third of this century, however, the Supreme Court's
recognition of the one-person, one-vote doctrine clarified (and arguably altered)
society's vision ofrepresentation.f2 At its core, the one-person, one-vote doctrine
established that all citizens have an equal right to choose their political
representatives, advance their political interests, and influence government. 13
Consequently, representation now focuses directly on the political interests of
citizens. As a result, our voting system can be described as a people-based
representation system that necessarily encompasses the land on which people live
rather than as a land-based apportionment system that necessarily provides
representation to the people who live on the land. While either vision can lead to a
land-based districting system, the importance of particular elements of the system
depends on how the system is viewed. The focus of the districting system now must
be to provide effective representation to all citizens.
Although the nature of repre.sentation has changed to focus on providing
representation to voters, the nature of districting has not. States continue to group
parcels of land that happen to support population and provide that land and the
people on it with common representation. While this may implicitly group people,
rather than land, and provide them with common representation, the political system
should do so more explicitly. Indeed, states should redefine their districting criteria
to provide representation to groups of people with common political interests to have

11

The expansion of the right to vote occurred slowly. Although universal male suffrage
was Jacksonian democracy's rallying cry, see 3 ROBERT V. REMINI, ANDREW JACKSON
AND THE COURSE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 139, 149 (1984), Jacksonian beliefs still
allowed racial and gender restrictions on suffrage. See DIXON, supra note I, at 44.
12
See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (announcing the one-person, one-vote
doctrine requiring districts of equal populations).
13
Broadly, the one-person, one-vote doctrine encourages universal representation. See
id. at 565-66 ("[T]he achieving of fair and effective representation for all citizens is
concededly the basic aim of legislative apportionment .. ,.").
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common representation in Congress. 14 Such a change would require an invigorated
emphasis on the interests of voters in the districting process and a concomitant deemphasis of traditional geography-based districting principles. While that could
temporarily cause disruption to the districting system, ultimately it would provide
better representation for voters. Common representation works best ifthe people who
are grouped in districts share political interests with respect to the issues on which
their representative will act. Because such a sharing of interests arguably no longer
occurs along compact districtirtg lines, •s compact districting is no longer as beneficial
a system as it once was.
However, society should not abandon districting. Single-member districting
continues to supply important benefits by fostering a relationship between an
identifiable representative and an identifiable constituency. 16 It is through that
relationship that constituents influence their representative, who is specifically
accountable to the constituents. This relationship provides a structure in which a
representative and her constituency can communicate, and provides the link that
makes representative democracy work. 17 Consequently, using districts, even land14

Districting fundamentals may change depending on the body being elected. Voters
can have common political interests vis-a-vis local or state government while having very
different political interests vis-a-vis Congress. The focus regarding the creation of
congressional districts must revolve around issues about which Congress tends to legislate.
See Daniel D. Polsby & Robert D. Popper, Ugly: An Inquiry into the Problem of Racial
Gerrymandering under the Voting Rights Act, 92 MICH. L. REV. 652,654 (1993) ("[I]t is
also true that no single, all-purpose normative theory of electoral mechanics will cover
every case of democratic representation, from county commissions to mosquito control
districts to sovereign legislatures. We do not claim that one can generalize our argument
to every sort of election to which the [Voting Rights Act] might apply.") [hereinafter Pols by
& Popper, Ugly].
.
15
See Stephen J. Malone, Recognizing Communities of Interest in a Legislative
Apportionment Plan, 83 VA. L. REV. 461,475-76 (1997) (discussing failure of compact
districting to reflect voters' shared interests).
16
See Paul L. McKaskle, Of Wasted Votes and No Influence: An Essay on Voting
Systems in the United States, 35 Hous. L. REV 1119, 1140-41 (1998) (noting advantages
of single-member districting) [hereinafter McKaskle, Wasted Votes].
17
Voters choose who will speak for them by determining who will best represent their
interests. Representative democracy may produce representatives who will reflect the will
of the people as if it were a direct democracy. See generally Sherman J. Clark, A Populist
Critique of Direct Democracy, 112 HARV. L. REV. 434, 437 (1998) (suggesting
representative democracy ma:y be the best way for individual voters to be heard in the
political system); MarciA. Hamilton, The People: The Least Accountable Branch, 4 U.
CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 6-7 (1997) (describing direct and representative democracy).
However, in some circumstances, voters may seek something other than the representation
of their personal interests. Nonetheless, this Article will assume that voters are rational and
that they will seek the representation of their personal interests. But see Hamilton, supra,
at 12-13 (suggesting that voters may not "i:lUtomatically vote out of relatively well-informed
self-interest"). Voters may choose a representative because the representative appears to
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based ones, in the process of providing representation is sensible, as long as the
political interests of citizens are the paramount consideration in structuring the
districting system;
The issue is how to create an apportionment system that preserves the benefits
of single-member districting, yet explicitly recognizes voters' political interests. This
Article proposes a new system of districting that would retain the core benefits ofthe
current single-member, geography-based districts while adding benefits that can flow
from an interest-based apportionment system. That system is enclave districting. 18
Enclave districting would allow states to divide jurisdictions into demographically
similar enclaves that then would be aggregated to create congressional districts with
internally consistent demographic profiles. Each state would determine the factors
used to create its enclaves based on the features each state believes are important to
electing its congressional delegation. The resulting districts might be compact and
contiguous, or might be relatively homogenous, interest-based, and non-contiguous.
The goal ofenclave districting is to maintain the relationship between representatives
and constituencies while providing the maximum latitude for states to apportion
representation based on voters' common interests. 19
Enclave districting loosens the structure of districting while maintaining
districting's salient features. At root, enclave districting asks why two
demographically similar areas that sensibly could be combined to create a single
district benefitting from common representation should not be combined merely
because they are in different parts of a state. As an illustration, consider two poor
farming areas in separate regions of a state. If each area is too small to populate a
single district, each may be combined with suburban or urban areas to create a
share a common background, and presumably common political interests, with the voter or
because the voter believes that the representative will be the most effective person to protect
the voters'· interests without regard to whether the representative herself actually shares the
voter's political interests. A poor district may rationally select a very wealthy representative
who does not have the same political interests of the poor as the representative may be an
!ncumbent who .can influence legislation, and thus, would be very influential in advancing
legislation favorable to the poor. Similarly, the representative may tirelessly advance the
interests of his constituents even if he does not share those interests, either because he wants
to be reelected or because he believes that selflessness is the nature of representation. This
suggestion ,is not meant to discount the possibility that a wealthy representative may share
political interests with the poor; rather, it is to suggest that a representative need not share
the interests of his constituents in order to champion those interests effectively. Such a
representative could be likened to a lawyer who advocates legal positions with which she
may not personally agree.
18
This Article relates most directly to congressional districting, but could be applied in
limited fashion to state or local legislative districts. However, this theory may lose some
accuracy in its translation. As a cautionary note, see supra note 14.
19
While enclave districting is interest-based, it is distinct from districting based solely
on communities of interest. See infra pt. V.
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district that may or may not serve the interests of the farming communities. Enclave
districting suggests that it is sensible to plac~ the two areas in the same district to
provide common representation to their citizens, even though the areas are not in the
same region of the state.
This Article reflects four key premises. First, the relationship between an
identifiable representative and an identifiable constituency is important. Second,
districting is about determining how people will be grouped for representation
purposes. Third, providing common representation for voters with common political
interests is important. Fourth, traditional districting principles are not sacred. The
structure of this Article is simple. Part I details the genesis of congressional
districting. Part II describes the benefits of single-member districting. Part III
broadly outlines current districting practices and attempts to define the core values
of the current districting process. Part IV contrasts interest-based and geographybased districting. Part V explains enclave districting.

I. THE GENESIS OF CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTING
Though congressional districting is deeply entrenched in American democracy,
the Constitution is. silent .on its appropriateness or desirability .20 Indeed, the
Constitution places relatively few explicit restrictions on the structure ofthe House
of Representatives (the "House")21 and has few requirements for being a
congressional representative. 22 The House consists of representatives from the
several states, with the size of a state's congressional delegation being determined by
the state's population. 23 A member of the House must be at least twenty-five years
20

The Constitution requires districting insofar as representatives represent particular
states. However, the Constitution does not require intrastate districting. See Christopher L.
Eisgruber, Ethnic Segregation by Religion and Race: Reflections on Kiryas Joel and Shaw
v. Reno, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 515, 526 (1995-1996) ("Indeed, the Constitution does not
explicitly say that the United States must have single-member congressional districts.");
Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts, "and Voting
Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances after Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV.
483, 527 n.l39 (1993) ("Nothing in the Constitution itself requires the states to create
congressional districts."). See generally Pildes & Donoghue, supra note 1, at 251-52 n.43
(detailing the history of representative districting).
21
For example, that the House consists of 435 members is not a constitutional
requirement. Congress simply stopped adding members when it reached 435. See
Christopher St. John Yates, A House of Our Own, or A House We've Outgrown? An
Argument for Increasing the Size ofthe House of Representatives, 25 COLUM. J.L & Soc.
PROBS. 157 (1992).
.
22
See U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 2. While U.S. representatives and senators are members of
Congress, in this Article, the term "congressional representative" and its variations will
refer only to members ofthe House of Representatives.
23
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. The Constitution fixed the number of
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old, must have been a citizen of the United States for at least seven years, and must
be a resident of the state she is to represent. 24 The Constitution otherwise does not
regulate how congressional representatives are to be selected. 2s
Although the Constitution does not require or restrict a state's particular method
· of electing congressional representatives, representatives have been elected almost
exclusively through single-member districts 26 since Congress passed the
Reapportionment Act of 1842 (the" 1842 Act"). 27 Before the 1842 Act, some states
representatives each state was to have until the first Census was taken.
24
See id at cl. 2.
25
However, if a vacancy occurs in a state's delegation to the House of Representatives,
the governor of that state has the power to fill the vacancy. See id at ct. 4.
26
Under certain circumstances, states have held at-large congressional elections. In
1962, Alabama held at-large elections for U.S. representatives because it had not
redistricted after population losses counted in the 1960 Census diminished its House
delegation from nine to eight. See Moore v. Moore, 229 F. Supp. 435, 436-38 (S.D. Ala.
1964) (holding Alabama's continued use of election plan unconstitutional); Alsup v.
Mayhall, 208 F. Supp. 713, 715-16 (S.D. Ala. 1962) (denying constitutional challenge to
Act 154 which provided for at-large elections in response to redistricting); White v. Frink,
145 So. 2d 435 (Ala. 1962); Jansen v. State ex rei. Downing, 137 So. 2d 47 (Ala. 1962)
(affirming validity of Act which regulated manner for nominating candidates for Congress).
Each political party was allowed to select a candidate for each of the nine pre-1962 districts.
See Alsup, 208 F.Supp at 714. Those nine ran in a runoff primary election for the eight slots
each party was allotted in Alabama's general election. See id. at 714-15. In Alsup, the court
denied a challenge that one of the nine districts would not receive representation as a result
of the winnowing feature of the plan. See id at 715-17. Current law provides for the atlarge election of congressional representatives in the event that a state loses representation
and does not redistrict in time for the next election. See 2 U.S.C. § 2a (1994 & Supp. III
1997).
27
Ch. 47, 5 Stat. 49L A proposed constitutional amendment in 1802 was the first
attempt at imposing a districting structure on the states, albeit for the purpose of electing
the President and Vice-President. See 7 ANNALS OF CONG. 263-64, 303 (1802). The
proposed amendment offered:
That the State Legislatures shall, from time to time, divide each State into
districts, equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives from such
State in the Congress of the United States; and shall direct the mode of
choosing an Elector of President and Vice President in each of the said
districts, who shall be chosen by citizens having the qualifications requisite for
Electors of the most numerous branch of the State Legislature; and that the
districts, so to be constituted shall consist, as nearly as may be, of contiguous
territory, and of equal proportion of population, except where there may be any
detached portion of territory, not of itself sufficient to form a district, which
then shall be annexed to some other portion nearest thereto; which districts,
when so divided, shall remain unalterable until a new census of the United
States shall be taken.
Jd at 603. Ultimately, the districting issue vanished from the proposal, which focused on
the selection and accountability of Presidentil!.l and Vice-Presidential Electors and
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chose representatives through at-large voting and others chose representatives through
districts. 28 The 1842 Act required that representatives be elected through singlemember districts consisting of contiguous territory. 29 The Reapportionment Act of
1901 required that districts be compact and contiguous. 30 This stipulation was also
eventually failed. See id at 1296. Additionally, numerous constitutional amendments were
proposed before 1842 to require districted congressional elections. See Pildes & Donoghue,
suprii note 1, at 253 n.46. All failed. See id.
28
See supra note 1.
29
In requiring districts, Congress formalized the common practice among the states. See
id. Supporters of the 1842 Act argued that the Act would endorse what was already
occurring in the majority of states while bringing uniformity to the manner in which
representatives were sent to the House. Uniformity was desired not only to ensure that all
states were selecting representatives in the same manner, but also to guarantee that
individual states would not vary their method of selection from election to election. See
CONG. GLOBE app., 27th Cong., 3d Sess. 493 (1842) (statement of Sen. Huntington). Only
by implementing a uniform system of districting would political minorities have an
opportunity to select a representative. See id. at 793 (statement of Sen. Bates).
The Act's opponents objected to it for several reasons. First, they claimed that the
districting requirement was not a time, place, or manner restriction on elections and, as a
result, the Act would impinge upon the rights guaranteed to the states by the Constitution.
See id at 585 (statement of Sen. Bagby). Second, they argued that this was a mandate to
the states that Congress simply could not enforce. See id Further, critics noted that in a
democracy, whether the candidate of one's choice wins or loses, the voter's right to vote is
left intact, and as such the voter has not been disfranchised. As for political minorities, they·
have no right to representation beyond the casting of the ballot. Senator Bagby of Alabama
spoke against the Act:
To disenfranchise, means to deprive of the rights of a free citizen. While the
right to vote according to the dictates of conscience and judgement remains
unfettered and uncontrolled, no man is disfranchised. It is said, however, that
it is destructive ofthe rights of minorities. Beyond the ballot-box, minorities
have no rights. I have been nurtured in the school and rocked in the cradle ·of
minorities. They have no right to be represented, either in a popular or political
point of view, as is clearly demonstrated by the result of every election, from a
constable up to the chief magistrate of the Union .... The only rational hope
. of minorities is founded in the ever-varying tide of public sentiment.
!d. at 584 (statement of Sen. Bagby). ·
The Reapportionment Act, after vigorous· deb~te in both houses of Congress, was
enacted into law on June 25, 1842. See .ch. 47, 5 Stat. 491. The enactment of the Act did
not quiet debate over the appropriateness of the districting requirement. Shortly after the
passage of the Act, the Connecticut State Legislature passed a resolution denouncing the
districting requirement. See CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 3d Sess. 104 (stating that
Connecticut was "denying the right of Congress to dictate to the States the mode in which
they shall elect their Representatives in Congress; and protesting against the exercise of that
right by the Congress ofthe United States, as a palpable and dangerous violation of rights
of the legislature and people ofthe States....").
3
° Ch. 93, 31 Stat. 733. Congress had retained the contiguousness requirement in the
Reapportionment Act of 1872, ch. 11, 17 Stat. 28, the Reapportionment Act of 1882, ch.
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required in the Reapportionment Act of 1911.31 The compactness and contiguousness
requirements were both eliminated in the Reapportionment Act of 1929,32 leaving
only the requirement that single-member districts exist. 33 No federal statute has
required either compactness or contiguousness since 1929. 34 Thus, while Congress
set some ofthe parameters for congressional districting for four score and seven years
of this nation's history, current federal law requires only that states create and
maintain single-member congressional districts. Nonetheless, many states continue
to create districts according to geography-based principles, including compactness,
contiguousness, and respect for natural boundaries. 35

II.

WHY SINGLE-MEMBER DISTRICTING?

Districting and at-large voting are the two major methods of electing
congressional representatives. 36 Districting divides an electorate or jurisdiction into
subsets which then elect individual or multiple representatives. Single-member
districts elect single representatives. Multi-member districts elect multiple
representatives. 37 Conversely, at-large voting schemes do not divide jurisdictions.
20,22 Stat. 6, and the Reapportionment Act of 1891, ch. 116,26 Stat. 735.
31
Ch. 5, 37 Stat. 13.
32
Ch. 28, 46 Stat. 26.
33
See id; Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. I, 6 (1932) (examining the interplay between the
Reapportionment Act of 1911, which required compact and contiguous districts, and the
Reapportionment Act of 1929, which did not); Karlan & Levinson, supra note 6, at 1206
n.24 (noting that compactness and contiguousness were rejected in 1929 Reapportionment
Act).
34
See Reapportionment Act, § 201, 2 U.S.C. § 2a (1994 & Supp. III 1997);
ReapportionmentActofl941, ch. 470,55 Stat. 761; Reapportionment Act of 1940, ch. 152,
54 Stat. 162. These are the most recent Reapportionment Acts.
35
Many states require compactness and contiguity in congressional districting, in state
legislative districting, or both. See, e.g., Mo. CONST. art. III, § 45 ("[D]istricts shall be
composed of contiguous territory as compact and as nearly equal in population as may be.");
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 2.91(2) (West 1997) ("The legislature intends ... that all districts
consist of convenient contiguous territory substantially equal in population, and that
political subdivisions not be divided more than necessary to meet constitutional
requirements."). Of course, the Supreme Court has specifically validated such an approach.
See also infra pt. IlL B.
36
If a jurisdiction is not districted in some way, it selects representatives at-large. See
Akhil Reed Amar, Lottery Voting: A Thought Experiment, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 193,
193-94 (suggesting that single-member and multi-member districting schemes are the two
ways to choose a legislature). An at-large system can be viewed as the ultimate multimember district in which all representatives run in the same district.
37
For example, a city that is divided into three wards for its city council but allows each
ward to select three councilors or councilmen would have a multi-member districting
scheme. While such a system might seem odd, having multiple representatives for a single
district might allow nearly every voter to feel as though one 'of their representatives
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Under traditional at-large schemes, each voter can cast one vote for each
representative to the legislature.38 While multi-memberdistricting and at-large voting
are distinguishable, they can appear very similar and can serve some of the same
purposes. 39 Districting and at-large voting are not exclusive~ the same voting scheme
can incorporate both systems. 40 Given the various options for electing political
representatives, we must ask why congressional representatives are elected from
single-member districts.
Single-member districting is historically familiar, 41 tracks many American views
represented their interests. See, e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 109 (1986) (noting
that the subject reapportionment plan called for 61 single-member districts, 9 doublemember districts, and 7 triple-member districts); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 758
( 1973) (indicating that the Texas House of Representatives used a combination of singlemember and multi-member districts). Indeed some congressional representatives have
proposed that states be allowed to have multi-member congressional districts. See H.R.
3068, 105th Cong. (1997) (calling for allowance of multi-member districts for states with
a proportional voting system). H.R. 3068 was referred to the House Committee on the
Judiciary on November 13, 1997, and to the Subcommittee on the Constitution on
December 16, 1997. See 143 CONG. REc. H10953-02, H10954. Currently, federal law bans
multi-member congressional districts. See 2 U.S.C. § 21(a) (1994 & Supp. III) (requiring
that each district choose single representative).
38
A city council for which each member is elected by the entire electorate uses an atlarge voting scheme. See Edward Still, Voluntary Constituencies: Modified At-Large Voting
as a Remedy for Minority Vote Dilution in Judicial Elections, 9 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.
354, 358 (1991) ("[I]n the usual at-large election to fill five seats, each voter would have
five votes to cast for five different candidates ...."). In some situations, a jurisdiction may
not want a particular individual representing any particular group of people. For example,
school board members arguably should represent every citizen's interests, rather than the
interests of any particular group of citizens.
39
See Binny Miller, Who Shall Rule and Govern? Local Legislative Delegations, Racial
Politics, and the Voting Rights Act, 102 YALE L.J. 105, 143 n.226 (1992) (noting similar
effect of both, yet noting that at-large voting is technically a sub-set of multi-member
districting). United States Senate elections can be viewed either as multi-member districting
schemes with entire states being the districts or as at-large schemes with the population of
the subject state being the entire electorate. The distinction is largely one of semantics. For
an interesting article on districting the U.S. Senate, see Terry Smith, Rediscovering the
Sovereignty of the People: The Case for Senate Districts, 75 N.C. L. REV. I (1996). State
senates are districted and those districts are subject to the one-person, one-vote requirement.
See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) ("We hold that, as a basic constitutional
standard, the Equal Protection Clause requires that the seats in both houses of a bicameral
state legislature must be apportioned on a population basis.").
40
Some city councils consist of councilors elected from districts and councilors elected
at-large. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1312(h)(l)(A)(1981).
41
See Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role ofGeographic Compactness
in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 173, 178 (1989) ("The
innate appeal of the geographic approach [to districting] lies in large part in its
familiarity.").
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regarding congressional representation, 42 and is an orderly way to send
representatives to Congress. 43 Additionally, by pairing a particular representative
with a particular constituency, single-member districting can provide better individual
and personal representation than other voting schemes. Such representation is
considered by some to be a fundamental principle of American democracy. 44 That
citizens can identify "their" congressman, who is ready and willing to hear their
entreaties, is meaningful and comforting. 4'
Single-member districting reflects a beliefthat representative democracy works
best when voters can closely identify with a representative, and a representative can
closely identify with her constituency. This style ofrepresentation requires an easily
identifiable constituency and a single representative selected by that constituency. 46
Such a vision of representative democracy is served most easily by single-member
districting, where a member of Congress is a voter's only dedicated representative.
42

See McKaskle, Wasted Votes, supra note 16, at 1124 ("The tradition of singlemember districts in the United States is strong and ancient--predating the adoption of the
Constitution.").
43
See id at 1142 (stating the single-member district provides advantages of"simplicity"
and "understandability").
44
For a general description of the Federalist and Anti-Federalist visions of
representation, see Wilson Carey McWilliams, The Anti-Federalists, Representation, and
Party, 84 Nw. U.L. REv. 12 (1989). While America is wedded to single-member districts,
the national legislatures of many other democracies are not chosen solely through singlemember districts. See DOUGLAS J. AMY, REAL CHOICES/NEW VOICES: THE CASE FOR
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 1-2 (1993)
(suggesting generally that the American districting system is a poor way to elect officials
and noting that few world democracies use it).
45
Indeed, knowing that one can tum to a congressman for constituent services is very
important. See Steven G. Calabresi, Some Structural Consequences of the Increased Use
of Ethics Probes as Political Weapons, 11 J.L. & POL. 521, 524 (1995) (noting the
importance of constituent services); see also Pamela S. Karlan, Loss and Redemption:
Voting Rights at the Turn ofa Century, 50 VAND. L. REv. 291,307 (1997) (suggesting that
constituent services are increasingly being handled without regard to the constituent's race).
It is interesting to note that citizens in Washington, D.C., do not have their own voting
member of Congress to hear their entreaties and petitions. The Constitution does not
provide for represeQtation for those citizens living in the federal district. See U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 2 (providing representation only for the several states); Lawrence M. Frankel,
Comment, National Representation for the District of Columbia: A Legislative Solution,
139 U. PA. L. REV. 1659, 1659·(1991) (explaining the District of Columbia's lack of
congressional representation). The push for statehood for the District of Columbia, which
would necessarily include congressional representation, has existed for many years. See,
e.g., H.R. 51, 104th Cong. (1995) (proposing statehood for District of Columbia with
concomitant congressional representation).
46
bistricting by territory also allows new arrivals to a state to know who their
representative is. This capacity is necessary if the new aJTival is to be provided with
representation as soon as she becomes a state resident.
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This relationship can create strong ties that yield good representation, because the
tighter the bond between a representative and her constituency, the better the
representation the voter will likely receive. 47
·
Single-member districting creates a symbiotic relationship between a
representative and her constituency. 48 The relationship encourages continued
interaction between a representative and her constituency that may foster clearer and
potentially more frequent communication between them. 49 That focused
communication allows the representative to advance the interests ofherconstituency
as she deems appropriate, providing the best opportunity for the constituency to
receive good representation.' 0 Additionally, the continuing relationship allows
constituents to hold the representative accountable in future elections for any
shortcomings made apparent during a representative's term.'' Of course, through
reelection, constituents can also reward a representative for good representation.
Single-member districting snugly fits a notion of representation in which a
representative will champion her constituency's interests.'2 The desirability of
47

While ties between voters and representatives can be strong in multi-member
districting and at-large voting plans, they likely will not be as strong as they could be in a
single-member districting scheme. Of course, that may be a reason to choose a multimember or at-large scheme. Weak ties may be preferable to strong ties if strong ties
constrain a legislator's independent judgment on issues. Conversely, weak ties may lead
to more difficult and less effective communication between a representative and her
constituency. In multi-member and at-large plans, the voter has several representatives who
may represent his interests, but none who is necessarily devoted to representing his
interests. With constituencies that are much larger than they would be under single-member
districting, representatives likely would have less of an opportunity to develop strong ties
within their constituency. This debate echoes that between Federalists and Anti-Federalists
regarding the preferability of small or large districts. See infra notes 65 & 67. Nonetheless,
while voters might yet be well-represented under multi-member or at-large schemes, the
opportunity to be well-represented with respect to a voter's individual interests appears
greater under a single-member districting scheme.
48
In an at-large system, a representative may have a vague notion of who voted for her.
Similarly, voters may have only a vague notion of who should or will represent their
interests.
49
See McKaskle, Wasted Votes, supra note 16, at 1140 (indiCating small size of singlemember districts "allows constituents greater access to the representatives (and vice
· versa)").
50
See id.
51
•
Electoral accountability is a serious check on the actions of representatives. See John
Choon Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor's Foot? The Inherent Remedial Authority ofthe
Federal Courts, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1121, 1143-44 (1996) (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 70,
at 477-78 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed., 1961)).
52
That a representative will advance his constituency's interest is largely an American
notion. See BIRCH, supra note 2, at 48-49 (suggesting that ''the radical notion that
sovereignty rests with the people and political representatives are the people's agents ...
as a working concept of government ... is exclusively American").
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closeness tracks the agency theory of representation, which suggests that
representatives are sent to legislatures as agents to advance their constituency's
interests. 53 Under that theory, the effectiveness of the agent-r.epresentative follows
directly from how well the representative's actions reflect the constituency's desires. 54
In a representative democracy, the representative is the voter's connection to the
government and is the vehicle through which the populace makes its desires known.
Consequently, single-member districting can encourage the twin beliefs that
individuals can affect policy and that government will protect and champion personal
interests.'' The closer a voter is to her representative, the more easily she can
influence the representative and policy. 56 That closeness is most easily achieved when
53

Whether a representative should work for constituents' interests or whether the
representative should think independently of his constituency are the bases for the differing
views of representation. See id. at 20 ("Innumerable writers and speakers have maintained
that elected representatives have a duty to act as agents for their constituents. . . . On the
other hand, the most influential theorists in the Western world have stressed the need for
elected representatives to do whatever they think best for the nation as a whole ....");
Mark A. Graber, Conflicting Representations: Lani Guinier and James Madison on
Electoral Systems, 13 CONST. COMMENTARY 291, 292 (1996) (differentiating the trustee
model of representation that allows representatives to rely on their sense of the public good
from the delegate model of representation which guides representatives to vote for their
constituents' policy preferences); Saul Levmore, Precommitment Politics, 82 VA. L. REV.
567, 567 (1996) (explaining the debate between the agent and trustee models and
concluding that the question is whether representatives should be "autonomous or
automatons"); Pitkin, supra note 2, at 19. For the purposes of this Article, the agency theory
of representation will embody the representative who largely attempts to advance the
interests of her constituents. See BIRCH, supra note 2, at 42-43 (arguing that many
Founders subscribed to this agency theory' of representation, though Birch names it the
delegate theory). The theory that this Article refers to as the delegate theory of
representation embodies the notion that the representative should consistently consider
interests other than those of his constituents before voting. See Hamilton, supra note 17, at
9 ("The Constitution frees representatives from direct control by the people during the term
of representation so that they may make the decisions that are in the country's best interest.
During the term of representation, they are given decisionmaking power that is independent
of the people.").
54
The vision of a member of Congress as an agent of her constituency is certainly
consistent with the one-person, one-vote doctrine, which stems from the notion that
"[l]egislators represent people, not trees or acres." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562
(1964).
55
At least one court has suggested that the protection of individual interests is at the
heart of representation. See Sokaogon Chippewa Community v. Babbitt, 929 F. Supp. 1165,
1173 (W.D. Wis. 1996) ("In our federal system of representative democracy, congressional
representatives are expected to represent the concerns of their constituents vigorously. This
expectation of spirited congressional advocacy applies not only to legislation but to any
governmental decision that affects constituent interests.").
56
See LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: fUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 84 ( 1994) (suggesting that districting can help constituents
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a legislator can be identified by an individual as her representative to the federal
government. Ifthe federal government protects individual rights and interests at all, 57
tying individual voters to a particular congressional representative as closely as
possible is particularly sensible because it provides the bestopportunity for the voter
to protect those individual rights and interests. 58
·
Additionally, a representative can better identify and advance her constituents'
interests under such a system. A representative can most easily advance the interests
ofher constituency when those interests are clearly or narrowly defined. 59 Such clear
definition is most likely to occur when the constituency is smaller and consists largely
of people with similar interests and similar views of government. 60 Single-member
districting creates the smallest...:...,.and affords the most homogeneous-constituencies
possible. 61 A homogeneous constituency is more likely to share similar views and
exhibit less dissent when its representative advances the constituency's interests. 62

feel connected to their representatives).
57
Arguably the federal government should focus on protecting individual rights and
interests. See Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty and the Constitution, 98 COLUM.
L. REv. 531, 535 (1998) (noting that accountability is best seen "as a structural feature of
the constitutional architecture, the goal of which is to protect liberty").
58
Short terms and term limits can be seen as ways to loosen those ties. The two-year
term for congressional representatives was a contested issue for the Framers of the
Constitution. Indeed, some would have preferred a shorter term of office. See THE
FEDERALIST NOS. 52, 53, at 327-30,332-36 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(assessing the arguments for a two-year term limit and for shorter terms). Of course, the
term limit issue is still argued. See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779
(1995). Interestingly, lengthening congressional terms has been seriously debated as
recently as 1966. See BIRCH, supra note 2, at 81 (noting President Johnson's suggestion of
four-year congressional term in 1966).
59
See Levmore, supra note 53, at 600-01 (indicating that bloc voting based on narrow
common interests can yield benefits to the bloc).
60
See Howe, supra note 2, at 2 (arguing that "[c)lassical republican thought" that
"republicanism worked best in homogeneous communities").
61
Vote Dilution, Discriminatory Results, and
. See Robert Barnes, Comment,
Proportional Representation: What is the Appropriate Remedy for a Violation of Section
2 ofthe Voting Rights Act?, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1203, 1223 n.88 (1985) (describing singlemember districts as "geographically smaller and more ethnically homogeneous"). Multimember and at-large systems, by definition, create fewer, more populous districts than
would a single-member system applied to the same jurisdiction.
62
While homogeneous districts may be easy to represent, they can mask other problems.
Indeed, there may not be a principled way to distinguish homogenous districts from districts
intentionally packed with a disfavored group. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel
Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting: Dr«Wing Constitutional Lines after Shaw v. Reno, 92
MICH. L. REV. 588, 630 (1993) (noting that homogeneous districts can be created from a
desire to lessen a group's electoral influence).
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The foregoing suggests that single-member districting facilitates the voters'
choice of a representative who will represent their parochial interests. 63 Of course,
the Congress that passed the Reapportionment Act of 1842 may have intended that
future Houses of Representatives be filled with legislators poised to advance the
personal interests of their constituents. Interestingly, if this was that Congress'
motivation, mandatory single-member districting may be the lasting legacy of the
Anti-Federalists. 64 · Though conventional wisdom suggests that the Anti-Federalists
lost the struggle surrounding the Constitution,6s the notion that districts be as small
as possible, with congressional representatives accountable largely to their
constituency rather than their state or the nation, is consistent with strains of AntiFederalist thought. 66
However, that congressional representatives represent particular districts does not
necessarily mean they will always advance the parochial interests of their
constituents. Members of Congress can and do vote with the broader interests of all

63

See GUINIER, supra note 56, at 126 (suggesting that some may envision the nature
of representation as being the ability to get whatever government or financial benefits one
can through their representative).
64
Indeed the Anti-Federalists preferred smaller districts that would bind representatives
as closely to the people as possible. See generally THEANTIFEDERALISTS, xxxix-lxi (Cecilia
Kenyon ed., 1966). Conversely, Federalists tended to favor large districts. See THE
FEDERALIST NO. I 0, at 82-83 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961 ); Graber, supra
note 53, at 300 ("Large voting districts were crucial to the Madisonian quest for publicspirited representatives. Publius defended vast geographic legislative districts because he
thought that such electoral units increased the number of worthy candidates and forced
voters to transcend parochial concerns when making electoral choices."). Interestingly,
small districts could render the Congress a replication of the state legislatures, an idea that
did not appeal to the Federalists. See THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 294 (James Madison)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (noting that the federal and state governments are "constituted
with different powers and designed for different purposes").
65
The Anti-Federalists lost major issues regarding the breadth and structure of the
Constitution. Nonetheless, they may have influenced how particular provisions of the
Constitution are or should be read. For commentary on the impact that the Anti-Federalist
thought has had on the Constitution and the American structure of government, see
generally, Symposium, Roads Not Taken: Undercurrents ofRepublican Thinking in Modern
Constitutional Theory, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1989).
66
·
See THE ANTIFEDERALISTS, supra note 64, at !iii (citing Anti-Federalist concern that
republican government over large area would lead to impersonal relationships between
representative and constituency); JACKSON TURNER MAIN, THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS:
CRITICS OF THE CONSTITUTION 1781-1788, at 135 (1961} (mentioning Anti-Federalist
desire for small constituencies "so that they would be intimately known by the electors and
intimately acquainted with the popular will"); Graber, supra note 53, at 305 (suggesting
that Anti-Federalists would support an electoral model that called for smaller districts and
a greater ability to elect representatives who specifically and staunchly support their
constituents' views).
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of their state's citizens or the American people in mind. 67 However, even if
legislators only voted in support of their constituencies' interests, Congress may yet
represent the interests of the nation. 68 The votes of a state's House delegation may
reflect the varied interests of the state's populace. By extension, the aggregate vote
ofthe House of Representatives may reflect the collective interests of the people of
the United States.69 When Congress acts, it may act in accord with the varied
interests of the American people or in the general national interest even when each
member votes based on the personal interests of his constituents. 70 Thus, single67

The delegate theory of representation suggests that representatives are chosen to
represent the general interest of the country in the best way they see fit. See BIRCH, supra
note 2, at 40 (discussing the notion of delegated or elective representation as encouraging
the representative to use his judgment in determining what is in the best interest of the
nation). For some, the delegate theory of representation refers to ideas that this Article has
referred to as the agency theory of representation. See supra notes 2 & 5'3-54. This is merely
a difference in terminology, not in substance. The delegate theory is an historically British
and European vision of representation that views the legislature as the body through which
the country is governed rather than the body through which the people are directly given
voice. See Graber, supra note 53, at 306 ("The central question of representative
government is whether electoral systems should minimize or maximize the impact of public
opinion on public policy .... The issue is the extent to which public officials should be
harnessed by public opinion.") (citing HANNA ·F. PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF
REPRESENTATION, 145 ( 1967)). While that vision does not precisely fit the American notion
of the Congress, the seeds of a delegate-style theory of representation were suggested by
some of the Constitution's framers. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, at 350 (James Madison)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first
to obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the
common good of society ....").
68
Regardless of why. members of Congress are chosen through single-member
districting, a representative's effectiveness will depend on how the legislature conducts
business. Even if single-member districting tends to favor the representation of local or
parochial interests, it remains compatible with a delegate theory of representation if
congressional representatives are generally persuaded only _by appeals to the national
interest. The fact that congressional representatives are chosen by local majorities may
mean little if Congress systematically ignores arguments based on local interests or if the
president vetoes legislation that is not in the national interest. See Thomas 0. Sargentich,
The Future of the Line Item Veto, 83 IOWA L. REV. 79, 123 (1997) (hypothesizing a
president who represents the national interest when making policy).
69
This may suggest that voting in favor of one's constituents' interests leads to no one
getting precisely what they want. It also may be the best solution of all, giving a tolerably
large number of people something close to what they want while not allowing any one
individual to have everything he wants.
70
Of course, the national interest may not exist apart from the collective interest of the
people. See Me Williams, supra note 44, at 14 (describing contrasting visions of common
interest as an "aggregate of private interest" and as "an objective collective interest"). Some
Anti-Federalists believed the federal government would be unable to serve all of the
interests of the people. See MAIN, supra note 66, at 129 (detailing Anti-Federalist concerns

152

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 8:1

member districting may allow citizens to be heard, while also allowing the collective
will of the people to be advanced.
While the above arguments suggestthat single-memberdistricting provides some
advantages that at-large districting cannot, they should not be taken to suggest that
at-large voting schemes are necessarily inconsistent with American notions of
representation. Representative democracy does not require districting to work well.
Citizens do not need the focused representation that single-member districting
provides in order to be reasonably well-represented in Congress. 71 While
representatives must speak for those they represent, it is not necessary that a
particular representative be the only speaker for any particular constituency or
citizen. Because congressional representatives can and do represent interests broader
than the individual interests ofconstituents, freeing representatives from their districts
could make representing those broader interests easier. 72 If congressional
representatives are to represent the collective interest of their state's citizens73 or the
collective interest of the American people, electing them in a manner that binds them
to a particular district may not be the best way to foster that style of representation.
Congress is a national body that legislates national issues. Choosing
congressional representatives through statewide elections could be a powerful
statement suggesting that local majorities should not and will not matter in
that a large nation controlled by a single government could not adequately protect the
varied interests of all of the nation's people).
71
See LEE EPSTEIN & THOMAS G. WALKER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOR A CHANGING
AMERICA: RIGHTS, LIBERTIES AND JUSTICE 770 n.4 (3d ed. 1998) ("During the first-half
century of the nation's history, it was common for the states to select their delegates to the
House of Representatives on an at-large basis rather than using the single-member
constituency plan."); Gordon E. Baker, Bases ofRepresentation, in REAPPORTIONMENT 2526 (Glendon Schubert ed., 1965) (indicating that representation in colonial America was
based on localities, regardless of size, reflecting the valuation of autonomous communities).
Similarly, representatio.n in the British Parliament has historically been based on land
rather than people. See GORDON E. BAKER, THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION:
REPRESENTATION, POLITICAL POWER AND THE SUPREME COURT 15 ( 1966) (indicating that
the size of the constituency in England was irrelevant because the delegates represented
localities, not people). The notion of politicians representing people or acting for others did
not arise until the Middle Ages. See Pitkin, supra note 2, at 2.
72
Of course, freeing congressional representatives from territorial districts could lead
them toward special interests. Those special interests have real reasons for attempting to
keep their favored candidates in office. See generally John 0. McGinnis, The Original
Constitution and its Decline: A Public Choice Perspective, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
195 (1997) (examining constitutional constraints on expropriation by special interests).
73
Note that the demand for states' rights protects the people's interest in configuring
their state governments and interpreting their state laws as they see fit. See generally
ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, THE STATES RIGHTS DEBATE, ANTIFEDERALISM AND THE
CONSTITUTION (1972). Ostensibly, the interests of individual citizens combine to become
state interests that then are protected.
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Congress. 74 A representative whose constituency is an entire state might feel freer to
represent the interests of his state or the nation if he is not politically constrained to
represent the specific interests of his constituency. 75 Therefore, at-large voting for
congressional representatives could be appropriate iflegislators should represent the
interests of their state or the nation rather than the interests of their constituents.
While such a notion would run counter to the idea that each representative should
serve as small a constituency as possible in order to represent that constituency's
interests, requiring small constituencies has no explicit constitutional support. 76
Different voting structures imply different values. While single-member
districting is not the only way to provide adequate representation to the populace, it
is the only way to provide a certain style of representation to the people. The
reasonableness and efficacy of single-member districting rest on a preferred vision of
congressional representation that stems from certain views of government and
representation. If, as many believe, congressional representatives primarily represent
the political interests of their constituents, single-member districting provides a
structured relationship that allows representatives the greatest ability to be responsive
to their constituents and allows those constituents the greatest ability to hold
representatives accountable for their actions. The value of accountability and
responsiveness of representatives is assumed. Ifaccountability is not a primary value
and society prefers representatives to do what is right rather than to do right by their
constituents, single-member districting arguably should be replaced by a system that
does not so directly support accountability.

III. CONSTRUCTING DISTRICTS
A. Creating Constituencies Through Districting
As districting is the process ofgrouping people and providing them with common
74

The Constitution does not prohibit a state with ten congressional seats from
conducting an at-large election and sending the candidates who garnered the ten highest
vote counts to Congress. As noted previously, federal law provides for at-large elections
in certain limited situations. See 2 U.S.C. § 2a (c) (1994) (allowing at-large elections when
a state loses representation and does not redistrict before the next election); supra note 34
and accompanying text.
75
This does not mean that all members of the delegation will act or think alike. Each
will still count on his background and vision of the state's interests to guide his
determination of policy. But see infra note 84.
76
However, one commentator has argued that the Constitution's command that the
number of representatives not exceed more than one per 30,000 citizens, see. U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 2, cl. 3, suggests that the Constitution views this as an appropriate number to
comprise a district. See generally Yates, supra note 21 (proposing that the Framers of the
Constitution intended that the House of Represenatives grow in proportion to the
population).
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representation, it confers the power to create and define constituencies.
Apportionment is the inclusion and exclusion of people" and land in and from
districts. 78 Through apportionment, legislatures structure the democratic process by
building the constituencies79 they deem appropriate.80 For example, if a legislative
majority wants to create districts encompassing politically homogenous voters
because it believes that such districts are easily represented, 81 then courts likely will

77

For an example of drawing lines to exclude people, see Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364
U.S. 339, 346 (1960) (drawing lines to exclude black citizens of Tuskegee, Alabama, from
municipal elections). For examples of drawing lines to include people, see Miller v.
Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 907-09 (1995) (drawing lines to include black citizens in a
congressional district); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630,633-34 (1993) (same).
78
The one-person, one-vote doctrine espoused in Reynolds v. Sims, 371 U.S. 533, 55865 (1964), requires that each district have equal population. Creating equipopulous districts
requires that citizens explicitly be included in or exCluded from particular districts.
However, since apportionment is ostensibly based on land (technically land on which people
live), land is that which is included in or excluded from districts. Traditional districting
relies on property and geography to divide and combine voters into districts. See Katharine
Inglis Butler, Affirmative Racial Gerrymandering: Rhetoric and Reality, 26 CUMB. L. REv.
313, 358-59 (1995-1996) (recognizing the traditional primacy of geographical interests in
districting). The shift to a one-person, one-vote model worked a subtle change in emphasis
from districting land to districting people. That change means that instead of looking at
land, and necessarily including the people on that land in the district, states look at people
and necessarily include the land on which they live in the district. It may also suggest that
districting based on land is incompatible with pOlitics based on the representation of
personal interests. See generally GUINIER, supra note 56, at 127-37 (detailing the link
among property, territory, and the representation of land rather than people).
79
See Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Standing and Misunderstanding in
Voting Rights Law, Ill HARV. L. REV. 2276,2292 (1998)(suggesting that reapportionment
concerns groups, and treating individuals as members of groups).
80
See Aleinikoff & lssacharoff, supra note 62, at 588 ("ln a democratic society, the
purpose of voting is to allow the electors to select their governors. Once a decade, how~ver,
that process is inverted, and the governors and their political agents are permitted to select
their electors.").
81
Districting can be used to create culturally homogeneous units that reflect the heritage
of their inhabitants. Such constituencies could be easier to represent because of their
homogeneity of outlook. See Richard thompson Ford, Geography and Sovereignty:
Jurisdictional Formation and Racial Segregation, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1365, 1391-96 (1997)
(discussing jurisdiction formation in which a main component is the desire to be racially
separate or segregated). Indeed, allowing like-minded people to vote together in various
elections simultaneously can yield continuity of views in all who represent the district, be
they city councilors, state representatives, state senators, or congressional representatives.
Cf Board ofEduc. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994) (noting the incorporation of a village
ofSatmar Hasidim Jews who wanted the village, and presumably its governance, to reflect
their religion and heritage).
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allow· such districting. 82 Similarly, the same legislative majority could construct
districts encompassing heterogeneous voters. 83 Whether districting power is used
appropriately or inappropriately depends on how and for what purposes it is
exercised, because the power to district or to model constituencies is also the power
to gerrymander. 84

82

See Ford, supra note 81, at 1383-86 (arguing that the Supreme Court has shown little
inclination to scrutinize intentionally created racially homogeneous local governments).
83
Heterogeneous constituencies may provide representatives who can compromise and
must consider the wide range of interests in their constituency before making policy.
Indeed, such representatives may tum policy away from extremes and toward the political
center. Some have suggested that such a tum to the political center is sensible. See
generally RICHARD DARMAN, WHO'S IN CONTROL? THE POLARIZATION OF AMERICAN
POLITICS AND THE REVIVAL OF THE SENSIBLE CENTER (1996) (chronicling the resurgence
of centrist national politics). Conversely, some commentators, if the title of their books are
to be believed, have little respect for those who seek the political center. See JIM
HIGHTOWER, THERE'S NOTHING IN THE MIDDLE OF THE ROAD BUT YELLOW STRIPES AND
DEAD ARMADILLOS {1997).
84
See GUINIER, supra note 56, at 121 ("Districting breeds gerrymandering as a means
of allocating group benefits; the operative principle is deciding whose votes get wasted.");
Karlan & Levinson, supra note 6, at 1209 n.37 (stating that "'[all] districting is
gerrymandering"') (quoting ROBERT G. DIXON, JR., DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION:
REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND POLITICS 462 (1968)); John R. Low-Beer, Note, The
Constitutional Imperative ofProportional Representation, 94 YALE L.J. 163, 173 ( 1984)
("The fundamental dilemma of geographical districting is that all districting is
gerrymandering."). Because districting is line-drawing, political gerrymandering can occur
whenever districts are created. See EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 71, at 769 ("Because
district lines determine political representation, the authority to draw those boundaries
carries with it a great deal of political power. Skillful construction of political subdivisions
can be used to great advantage, and politicians have never been reluctant to use this power
to advance their own interests."). When gerrymandering is particularly entrenched, slim
majorities can leverage their numerical advantage to hegemonic superiority. See Daniel D.
Polsby & Robert D. Popper, The Third Criterion: Compactness as a Procedural Safeguard
Against Partisan Gerrymandering, 9 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 301,302 {1991) (indicating
that gerrymandering allows "a party that enjoys only a small majority in popular support
over its principal competitor [to]. .. translate this popular edge into preemptive institutional
dominance") [hereinafter Polsby & Popper, Third Criterion]; see also Frank R. Parker,
Racial Gerrymandering and Legislative Reapportionment, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION
85 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1984) (labeling gerrymandering as "any redistricting practice
which maximizes the political advantage or votes of one group, and minimizes the political
advantage or votes of another"). Whether majorities should be allowed to leverage votes
depends on the proportion of decisions a majority should be allowed to make. See GUINIER,
supra note 56, at 12 (questioning whether those who win 51% of the vote should necessarily
make 100% of the decisions). Of course, as long ils significant political minorities who are
eligible to vote do so, gerrymandering is a dangerous·game. While officials can herd voters
intc:> particular districts, the representatives elected from.districts that essentially are given
away could cause real problems in the legislature, even if legislators from those districts and

156

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 8:1

Although districting is always subject to abuse, not all districting schemes are
qualitatively similar. Some districting rules are more objective or process-oriented,
while others are more subjective or result-oriented. Consider two rules. The first
states that Counties A, B, and C are to comprise Congressional District 1. The
second rule states that communities where farming is the predominant occupation
shall be combined to create congressional districts wherever possible. Both rules
appear to suit a purpose and appear to be fair. The first rule is more objective than
the second and is less prone to manipulation. This does not necessarily mean that less
legislative wrangling occurred before its adoption. 85 Rather, it suggests that once the
first rule is in place, nothing can be done to avoid its intended effect.
The second rule is more flexible and more likely to yield gerrymandering because
it states a general rule, rather than a specific command. However, the second rule
may group voters with similar concerns better than the first rule. If retaining
cohesion among farming communities is important, then the second rule may be
necessary. However, defining what is a farming community may become a problem
both for those communities that wish to be considered farming communities and those
that do not. Allowing legislative majorities to decide which communities wi II be and
will not be deemed farming communities can lead to explicit modeling of
constituencies, that is, the conscious inclusion and ex.clusion of specific groups of
voters in a district. While the second districting rule is not bad, it poses a greater
threat of gerrymandering abuse than the first, precisely because it allows a more
detailed modeling ofconstituencies. The more detailed the modeling of constituencies
becomes, the more the process resembles gerrymandering.
Although gerrymandering is a concern in districting, subjectivity in constructing
districts is not unlawful. While states are required to have congressional districts,
they retain significant latitude in structuring them. 86 Aside from the constitutional
requirement that congressional districts contain equal populations,87 states are free
to design districting plans based largely on political considerations. 88 While states
their allies do not constitute a majority of the legislature.
8
s For example, Counties A, D, and E could be more suited to amalgamation than
Counties A, B, and C, but other political factors could make the ABC combination more
appropriate. For example, in the redistricting process that led to Shaw v. Reno, the North
Carolina legislature created the oddly-shaped 12th Congressional District to avoid upsetting
incumbent congressmen. See Aleinikoff & lssacharoff, supra note 62, at 591.
86
See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952,978 (1996) (recognizing flexibility retained by states
with respect to districting).
87
See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,577 (1964).
88
While political gerrymandering does have some limits, those limits likely do not
heavily influence districting plans. See Karlan & Levinson, supra note 6, at 1208-09
(suggesting that blatant political gerrymandering is accepted); Richard H. Pildes, Principled
Limitations on Racial and Partisan Redistricting, 106 YALE L.J. 2505,2513 n.26 (1997)
("Thus Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986), has never been applied by a lower court
to strike down any districting plan for a legislative body at any level of governance.").
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retain latitude in structuring con~tituencies, they do not write on a blank slate. This
country's history of state and congressional districting has provided a number of
traditional districting principles that stand as historical bases for districting. States
historically have used various criteria, such as compactness, contiguousness,
incumbent protection, and respect for natural and political boundaries to create
congressional, state legislative, and other districts. 89 The Supreme Court has
validated these principles as the baseline for districting. 90 Consequently, the use of
these principles indicates to the Supreme Court that states have engaged in
historically appropriate apportionment. 91
The Supreme Court does not tend to scrutinize apportionment plans that utilize
traditional districting criteria. Although the use of these traditional criteria is not
mandatory, 92 deviation from those criteria suggests that gerrymandering may have
occurred.93 Although the Supreme Court has not invalidated many, ifany, districting
plans because of political gerrymandering, it has made clear that it stands ready to
do so.94 This may explain why states have not been particularly bold in altering their
districting systems. 95 A state's blueprint for districting is relatively clear-create the

.

.

Conversely, limits on pro-minority racial gerrymandering seriously constrain districting
plans.
89
These criteria have been considered the traditional, appropriate criteria for districting.
See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 906 (1995) (allowing the state legislature to pass
redistricting procedures endorsing "contiguous geography, fidelity to precinct lines where
possible, . . . maintaining the integrity of political subdivisions, preserving the core of
existing districts, and avoiding contests between incumbents").
90
See Bush, 517 U.S. at 952, 964 ("(W]e have recognized i!lcumbency protection ...
as a legitimate state goal."); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 646 (1993) ("[D]istrict lines may
be drawn, for example, to provide for compact districts of contiguous territory, or to
maintain the integrity of political subdivisions." (citing Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 578)).
91
However, some have suggested that fidelity to and the prevalence of traditional
districting principles have not been as common as courts indicate. See Karlan & Levinson,
supra note 6, at 1205-07 (noting that some traditional principles are not particularly
traditional); see also Samuel Issacharoff, The Redistricting Morass, in AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION AND REPRESENTATION: SHAW V. RENO AND THE Fl,JTURE OF VOTING 201, 220
(Anthony A. Peacocked., 1997) ("In the absence of any real content to the Court's repeated
invocation of the 'traditional principles of districting,' there remains the gnawing
impression that the rules of the game were changed only when minorities started to figure
~~~~~
92

.

.

See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647 (noting that the Constitution does not require the use of
any particular districting criteria).
93
See, e.g., Bush, 517 U.S. at 980 (noting that "deviations from traditional districting
principles" are of constitutional concern).
.
94
See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. I09, 118-27 (1986)(noting the justiciability of pure
political gerrymandering claims).
95
States could be much bolder with districting. See Pildes, supra note 88, at 2534-35
(hypothesizing various extremely nontraditional ways to district, including the random
assignment of voters to districts); Polsby & Popper, Ugly, supra note 14, at 672 (suggesting
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constituencies the legislature desires, but do so using traditional principles.

B. Compact Districting
States commonly use geography-based principles, including· compactness,
contiguousness, respect for natural boundaries, and respect for political subdivisions,
to create· congressional districts. 96 The Supreme Court has validated this approach,
viewing compact districts of contiguous land as the epitome of appropriate
districting. 97 Therefore, this section of the Article focuses generally on geographybased principles and specifically on compactness and contiguousness as the
prototypical geography-based districting principles. 98 Additionally, this section
considers some ofthejustifications for and limitations of using compactness and
contiguousness in districting.
Compactness is a relative concept that focuses on the shape of a district and
considers whether districting lines could be made more uniform or whether a district
could be of a more regular shape. 99 Consequently, one district can be said to be more
endless ways to district on the basis of characteristics not related to land). For example, a
state with 10 congressional districts could randomly assign its voters to districts. Such a
districting scheme would produce I0 demographically similar .districts that could produce
I 0 similar representatives. While such a delegation might not be diverse, it could forcefully
position itself as· a voting bloc. See James A. Gardner, Liberty, Community and the
Constitutional Structure ofPolitical influence: A Reconsideration ofthe Right To Vote, 145
U. PA. L. REV. 893,923-25 (1997) (reviewing plaintiff's argument in Whitcomb v. Chavis,
403 U.S. 124, 144 (1971), that voters in multi-member districts are over-represented
because representatives from those districts vote as a bloc). Since each representative would
represent demographically similar districts, each representative might be expected to vote
similarly on issues. That scheme could strongly protect a state's interests.
96
See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900,916 (1995) {placing burden on plaintiff to show
the legislature relied on racial considerations as opposed to principles such as contiguity
and compactness).
97
For example, the decision in Shaw v. Reno hinged almost entirely on whether North
Carolina's 12th Congressional District was geographically compact. See Shaw, 509 U.S.
at 647; see also Ford, supra note 81, at 1407 ("Many commentators believe that geography
should function as an independent criterion for electoral districting, vindicating an ancient
concern with territorial solidarity.").
98
While the other geography-based districting principles mentioned are important, the
Supreme Court has focused on compactness. See Bush, 517 U.S. at 979; Miller, 515 U.S.
at 916; Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647. Additionally, much of what is said about compactness and
contiguousness can apply to the other geography-based principles. Nonetheless, this Article
will mention other geography-based principles by name when appropriate.
99
While different definitions of compactness exist, the Supreme Court has settled on
one based on a district's appearance. See Miller, 515 U.S. at 908-10 (describing the shape
of the district); Shaw, 509 U.S. at 635-36 (same). But see Bush, 511 U.S. at 962 (suggesting
that compactness is not solely about the regularity of district lines). Of course, regularity
may depend upon context. Whether a circle or a square or a triangle is regular in the
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compact than another. 100 Conversely, contiguousness is an absolute concept that
focuses on whether one can travel to all parts of a di~trict without ever leaving the
district. 101 Thus, compactness and contiguousness are related, 102 but are not the ·
same. Nonetheless, contiguousness and compactness are rarely analyzed
separately, 103 and compactness tends to subsume contiguousness. Compact districts
must be contiguous, but contiguous districts may not be compact. 104 The key issue,
. however, is identifying the benefits that compact, contiguous single-member districts
provide that non-compact, non-contiguous single-member districts do not.
1. Justifying Compactness .
While states must create congressional· districts, 105 no · federal statutory
requirements remain in effect governing construction. 106 Consequently, the use of
compactness and contiguousness as districting principles rests on their
appropriateness. Compact, contigt,tous single-member districting schemes provide at
least four benefits that other single-member districting schemes cannot. First,
compact districting affords maximum geographic diversity in a state,s congressional
delegation. Second, compact districting can yield convenient campaigning. Third,
compact districting can help protect local majorities from being splintered
geographically by an unsympathetic or gerrymandering legislative majority. Fourth,
compact districting best vindicates the principle thatthose who live in close proximity
should have common representation.

context of any particular state is debatable.
100
See infra note 152 (indicating that degrees of compactness can be measured). The
question is whether a specific number of voterS c;an be corralied with· more uniform lines.
Often, the answer to this question is yes. This can cause problems since counties and other
subdivisions, which have traditionally comprised districts, may not have. boundaries that
create regular district shapes.
101
This Article does not suggest that whether a district is contiguous cannot be disputed;
it is merely to say that a district is either contiguous or it is not. See Paul L. McKaskle, The
Voting Rights Act and The "Conscientious Redistricter," 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 60 n.282
( 1995) (providing examples of districts that could be deemed non•contiguous or contiguous
depending upon definition ofcontiguousness); see also Aleinikoff& lssacharoff, supra note
62, at 660 (stretching the notion of contiguousness)~ ..
102
See Pildes, supra note 88, at 2534.
103
See Bernard Grofman, Criteria for Districting: A. Social Science Perspective, 33
UCLA L. REV. 77, 84 (1985); Richard G. Niemi, The Relationship Between Votes and
Seats: The Ultimate Question in Political Gerrymandering, 33 UCLA L. REv. 185! 187
(1985); Polsby & Popper, Third Criterion, supra note 84, at 330 n.l39.
104
See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 657-58 (invalidating a contiguous, but non-compact, district).
105
See 2 U.S.C. § 2a (1997).
106
See supra pt. I.
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a. Maximizing Geographical Diversity of Representation
Compact districting helps maximize the geographical diversity of a state's
representation by ensuring that constituencies in different parts of the state select ·
representatives. Single-member districting creates districts with the smallest
constituencies possible. Compact districting ensures that those districts are spread
across different regions of a jurisdiction. Simply, a districting plan consisting of
districts following irregular paths or encompassing strips of land extending into
various areas of a state is not a compact one. This does not mean that non-compact,
single-member districting schemes necessarily will not or can not yield diverse
geographical representation. Rather, it suggests that one need not worry about
diverse geographical representation when all districts are compact. 107
Diverse geographical representation may not be important in some states, but
may be very important in others. If a citizenry's political interests vary with
geography, geographical diversity of representation may be necessary to ensure that
each of a state's interests are represented by at least one member of the state's
congressional delegation. For example, a state whose geography encompasses
farmland, grazing land, and mountains may wish to ensure geographical diversity of
representation with a reapportionment law requiring compactness so that farmers,
ranchers, and mountain dwellers would be guaranteed the ability to select at least one
representative. However, such a law may be unnecessary to provide most of the
benefits of geographical representation. Any districting scheme providing
representation for geography-based political interests would be sufficient. While
compactness is helpful in guaranteeing that geography-based interests are protected,
it is not the only method for doing so.
While diverse geographical representation may be important, maximum
geographical representation may not be. If the interests of voters in all parts of a
state are represented, it may not matter that a state's congressional delegation is not
quite as geographically diverse as it might be under a compact apportionment scheme.
If a non-compact districting plan can provide adequate representation for voters in all
geographic sections ofa state, requiring compactness may not provide any additional
benefit. Of course, if maximizing the geographical diversity of representatives is very
important to a state's citizenry, any deviation from compact districting could be
problematic.

107

See Pildes & Donoghue, supra note 1, at 252-53 n.45 (relating Pennsylvania's
abandonment of at-large elections after the first congressional delegation it elected
consisted of eight Federalists from eastern Pennsylvania).
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b. Easing Campaign Costs
The most practical benefit ofcompact districting is that it can make campaigning
easier. 108 By definition, the more compact a district is, the less far-flung it is. At its
extreme, non-compact districting could lead to districts comprised ofterritory located
in every region of the state, effectively making some congressional races statewide
races. 109 Given the cost ofcongressional elections and the complaints that candidates
must raise money without pause in order to run campaigns, statewide races for
congressional seats could make campaigning for those seats prohibitively costly for
all but the most wealthy or well-supported citizens. 110 Additionally, the time
commitment necessary to campaign across a state rather than just across a district
might deter individuals from seeking office. Whether this would negatively impact
representation, of course, is debatable.
c. Stopping Gerrymanders

Compactness can help prevent political gerrymanders, 111 but there likely are few
108

Judicious line drawing can create jurisdictions that are easy to govern and easy to
canvass. For example, historically, county lines were often drawn in order to allow easy
communication between county citizens and county government. County lines were drawn
so that a citizen could reach the county seat within one day's ride from his home. See
ROBERT B. MCKAY, REAPPORTIONMENT: THE LAW AND POLITICS OF REPRESENTATION 25
(1965). The desired result was better and more frequent communication from government
to citizen and from citizen to government.
109
Of course, states with only one U.S. Representative already have statewide districts.
For a list of those states, see infra note 184. However, nothing short of giving all states at
least two U.S. Representatives can remedy that situation.
110
See Cornelius P. McCarthy, Campaign Finance: A Challenger's Perspective on
Funding and Reform, 6 J.L. & POL'Y 69, 72 (1997) (discussing high cost of congressional
campaigns). Congressional candidates might be limited to those with personal, expendable
fortunes or those sufficiently well-known to receive contributions from a vast number of
organized groups. Indeed, the Anti-Federalists complained of this possibility from the
beginning of the Republic. See Carol M. Rose, The Ancient Constitution vs. The Federalist
Empire: Anti-Federalism From the Attack on "Monarchism" to Modern Localism, 84 NW.
U. L. REv. 74, 90 (1989) (mentioning Anti-Federalist concerns that large districts would
lead to the election of the wealthy). While such a limitation on candidates may already
exist, it would likely get worse with statewide congressional elections. Of course, concerns
arise surrounding special interests when candidates are well-supported by groups. Concerns
regarding the effect of special interests have existed since the founding of the Republic. See
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 79-80 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
111
See Parker, supra note 84, at 85 (suggesting that the 1842 Reapportionment Act's
contiguous and compactness requirements were aimed at ending excessive
gerrymandering); see also 'Polsby & Popper, Third Criterion, supra note 84, at 332-34
(discussing use of compactness requirement to limit gerrymandering).
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situations in which a compactness requirement alone would stop a gerrymander. In
order for a compactness requirement to stop a congressional gerrymander, a local
majority would have to be sufficiently populous over such a wide territory that no
compact district or districting plan could be drawn to divide that local majority. 112
Because compact districts can be drawn in numerous ways, many different plans
could splinter a local majority, yet escape scrutiny. While a compactness requirement
would dramatically narrow the number ofacceptable plans a legislature could enact,
it is unclear whether the choices would be so dramatically narrowed that compactness
alone could prevent any particular gerrymander. 113
A compactness requirement can, however, powerfully protect local majorities
when used in conjunction with other geography-based districting principles. 114 A
compactness requirement coupled with respect for political and natural boundaries
could create a narrow range of acceptable districting plans. For example, if the
· county system and river system in a state created five regions of roughly equal
population, and the state had five congressional representatives, districting plans that
did not allocate one representative to each region would likely appear suspect. A rule
requiring both compactness and respect for political and natural boundaries could
protect any local or regional majority splintered by such a plan. 115 While this may
appear to represent a narrow band of cases, in the situations where these conditions
exist, compactness coupled with other factors might be the only chance for the local
majority/statewide minority to be represented adequately.

112

Merely applying a compactness requirement would necessitate that the local majority
be able to claim that only non-compact plans would splinter their constituency. Such a local
majority would likely need to be extremely compact,. such that it would always fit inside of
any compact district, or it would have to be sufficiently widespread to be a majority in some
district in any conceivably compact districting plan. Local majorities consisting of racial
minorities are treated somewhat differently, as Thornburgh v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 ( 1986),
requires only that such a local majority be geographically compact enough to dominate
some district that could be drawn surrounding it. See id at 49-51.
113
A local majority may only be one because of how it is defined. Many different
groupings of people may constitute local majorities. For example, Democrats, Black
Americans, farmers, or families with annual incomes over $250,000, could all be local
majorities. Indeed, they can be local majorities even though they may be minorities if the
locale were widened just a little. ··
114
See Polsby &. Popper, Third Criterion, supra note 84, at 330-31 (noting the
importance of compactness and contiguity in eliminating a significant number of districting
options and thus a significant number of gerrymandering options).
115
Of course, such a rule would have to be a state law or regulation directed to the state
legislature or redistricting committee. Note that state statutes generally provide guidance
to legislatures and redistricting committees. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 906
(1995) (noting that the Georgia legislature adopted redistricting guidelines after the 1990
Census).

1999]

ENCLAVE DISTRICTING

163

d. Providing Common Representation for Neighbors

The most important feature of compact districting is that it validates the notion
that those who live close to each other should have common representation. 116 This
Article refers to this notion as the "residence proximity principle." The residence
proximity principle rests on an assumption that people who live in close proximity
share similar political interests or, at least, share more similar political interests than
those who do not live in close proximity. As applied to congressional elections, the
residence proximity principle suggests that citizens who live close to one another
share political interests vis-a-vis Congress. 117 If the residence proximity principle is
accurate, compact districting groups like-interested citizens. 118 For example, if the
representative is being chosen for a body that only decides issues related to property,
compactness reasonably may be a paramount consideration in districting. 119
However, if one is choosing a representative for a body that does not decide issues
related to property, little reason, aside from convenience, may exist to retain
compactness as a core districting principle.
Voters who live in the same geograP,hic area will certainly have common interests
on some legislative matters. Citizens who live close to each other may desire the
passage of a particular piece of legislation because it will benefit all in close
proximity. Likewise, they may desire the defeat of a piece of legislation that will

116

See Pildes & Niemi, supra note 20, at 483 ("As embodied in election districts,
physical territory is the basis on which we ascribe linked identities to citizens and on which
we forge ties between representatives and constituents.").
117
Many commentators do not believe this to be convincing support for compact
districting schemes. See, e.g., GUINIER, supra note 56, at 127 (suggesting that the residence
proximity principle is a long-standing, if misguided, justification for geographical
districting); Ford, supra note 81, at 1416-17 ("If it seems reasonable ... to assume that
residence is equivalent to community, this is so largely because the present legal regime ties
so many of the activities and the affiliations of political membership to residence. To tacitly
rely on this legally constructed affiliation to justify further entrenching residence as the
criterion for community is to engage in circular reasoning.").
118
This may lead such a constituency to elect a like-interested representative. Whether
this is necessary or desirable is debatable. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 56, at 346-47 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (suggesting that a representative's familiarity with
his constituents' interests is only crucial for those issues on which the representative will
act).
119
See Still, supra note 38, at 360 ("Districting plans are based on the implicit
assumption that voters have an identity of interest with their geographical neighbors. While
my neighbors and I may have a common interest in whether the city repaves the street in
front of our houses or rezones the lot on the comer for use as a fraternity house, on other
issues we probably have no commonality.").
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harm all in close proximity. 12° Consequently, the residence proximity principle holds
most strongly when the interests that matter to citizens are interests that are Iinked to
where they live. 121 If the federal government often legislates on issues that are
closely related to where citizens live or that have similar impact on citizens living in
close proximity, structuring congressional districting around the residence proximity
principle may be sensible. 122
Federal legislation can have distinctively local effects on citizens living in close
proximity. For example, laws like the 1998 federal.highway law, 123 can impact
localities significantly. Areas that will have improved roads due to the law will
uniquely benefit from that law. Even if the law benefits every congressional district
in the country, each citizen benefits locally. Citizens benefit not because federal
legislation has been passed to help all Americans, but because they live in a particular
place in the United States. While anyone will be allowed to use federal highways
built pursuant to the highway law, the primary beneficiaries will be the local citizens
who will use those roads every day. Similarly, laws focusing either on urban
problems or on rural problems can uniquely affect particular geographic areas. 124
Indeed, targeted local effects are the aim of such laws. The more that federal laws

° Consider the similar interests of neighbors whose neighborhood may be condemned
to make way for a state highway. Although some of the neighbors may favor the proposal
and some oppose it, all neighbors will have an interest in how the issue is determined. See
Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State
Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 875 n.207
(1998) (discussing neighbors' shared interests in defeating legislation). Similarly, a district
completely comprised of farming communities might want representative from that
district who understood farming issues or was from a farming background, even if the
representative did not always vote in the farmers' best personal interests. If compactness
could result in the formation of such districts, compactness would be a sensible principle
around which to build congressional districting.
121
This can be the case if property, particularly real property, is the central organizing
principle of the subject government or if that government deals with property or propertyrelated rights. A sensitivity to property rights in general can provide neighbors with shared
political interests, particularly if governmental decisions tend to affect tracts of real property
encompassing several landowners.
122
This idea is particularly powerful if a representative is to serve the individual interests
of his constituency, rather than the general interests of the state he represents. See supra
pt. II.
123
See Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century, Pub. L. No. 105-178, 112 Stat.
107 (1998)(to be codified at 23 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.).
124
See, e.g., Agricultural Market Transition Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-27, 110 Stat.
896 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 7201-7333 (Supp. IV 1998)) (overhauling the
federal government's system of agricultural subsidies and price support); Urban Asthma
Reduction Act of 1998, H.R. 3897, 105th Cong. (seeking to reduce suffering due to asthma
among inner city residents, especially children, through an urban cockroach management
program).
12

a
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and actions narrowly affect particular geographic areas, the more sensible basing
districting on the residence proximity principle is. Conversely, the fewer such laws
that Congress passes, the weaker the justification for districting based on the
residence proximity principle. Interestingly, this analysis suggests that as Congr~ss'
attention to parochial interests increases, the stronger the case for geography-based
districting becomes. Put another way, the more Congress focuses on the problems
of localities, the more sense it makes to keep districts compact and contiguous. 125
While theorizing that compactness is a tool that facilitates parochialism in
Congress and that it provides Congress additional control over localities may be
accurate, such theorizing may ignore a simpler, and possibly stronger, historical
justification for compactness. Given the importance of property, the purpose of the
federal government, and the voting restrictions of the time, the residence proximitY
principle may tiave been more clearly justified atthe founding ofthe United States. 126
The emphasis that the United States historically placed on property, property rights,
and property ownership in voting may have made compactness a reasonable
organizing principle for districting. 127 Property's historical centr~lity to American
life can hardly be overstated. 128 Land is power, and our com'lection to it powerful. 129
Man:Y individual rights and states' rights historically have flowed from land and other
property. For example, individual voting rights historically depended on property

125

Arguably, Congress should not handle local issues, unless they have national impact.
While highway bills and general aid to cities can be viewed as issues with national impact,
they can also be viewed as local issues.
126
While compactness was only required for congressional districting beginning in 1901
and lasting for 28 years, its roots stretch further back into American history. See supra pt.
I.
127

See MILTON D. MORRIS, THE POLITICS OF BLACK AMERICA 57 (1975) (suggesting
that the conception of property was more firmly fixed in the founders' minds than the
concept of democracy).
128
Indeed, in an agrarian society, land can appear to be life itself. See John Crowe
Ransom, Reconstructed but Unregenerate, in I'LLTAKE MY STAND: THE SOUTH AND THE
AGRARIAN TRADITION 1, 19-20 ( 1930)
He identifies himself with a spot of ground, and this ground carries a good deal
of meaning; it defines itself for him as natUre .... A man can contemplate and
explore, respect and love, an object as substantial as a farm or a native
province. But he cannot contemplate nor explore, respect nor love, a mere
turnover, such as an assemblage of 'natUral resources,' a pile of money, a
volume of produce, a market, or a credit system. It is into· precisely these
intangibles that industrialism would translate the farmer's. farm. It means the
dehumanization of his life.
/d.
129

See Frank Lawrence Owsley, The Irrepressible Conflict, in I'LL TAKE MY STAND,
supra note 128, at 61, 69-71 (noting the physical and emotional connection between

landowner and land).
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ownership. 130 Similarly, property played a role in determining the number of
congressional representatives granted to slave states. 131 Because the Constitution can
be regarded as a compromise between slave and non-slave states over the issue of
human property, 132 it is not surprising that property and property-based interests have
always been central to representation. 133 At its founding, the United States was an
overwhelmingly agrarian nation. For many people, their residence was their property,
their property was their livelihood, and their livelihood was dictated by their
property; 134 At that time, the struggle between agrarianism and industrialism over
130

Historically, property was central to detennining the right to suffrage. Indeed the 24th
Amendment was passed to make sure that poll taxes were not used as a property-based
method of discrimination. See Gerald L. Neuman, Constitutional Equality: Equal
Protection, "General Equality" and Economic Discrimination/rom a U.S. Perspective, 5
COLUM J. EUR. L. 28I, 295 (1991). Arguably, poll taxes are. a mild fonn of property
requirement. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663,683 (1966) (Harlan,
J., dissenting) (linking property requirements for voting and the state poll tax). Although
poll taxes were ostensibly meant to insure that the voter had some real interest in voting,
they acted to require that the voter have sufficient personal property to be able to purchase
the right to vote. Of course, the 24th Amendment to the Constitution ended poll taxes. See
U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV.
131
The three-fifths clause of the Constitution allowed states representation based, in part,
on their population of human property, that is, slaves. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3
(effectively repealed by the 13th Amendment); THE FEDERALIST NO. 54, at 337-38 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (discussing generally the dual nature of slaves as
humans and property).
132
The debate regarding how to treat slaves for apportionment of representation and
apportionment of taxes was detailed in the Federalist Papers. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 54,
at 337-38 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
133
See ELY supra note 8, at 3 ("Historically, property ownership was viewed as
establishing the economic basis for freedom from governmental coercion and the enjoyment
of liberty."). But see Dorothy E. Roberts, The Priority Paradigm: Private Choices and the
Limits ofEquality, 57 U. PITI. L. REV. 363,369 (1996) (noting that the Framers' protection
of property rights led to tension between individual liberty and equality).
134
This was particularly so in the South, where the idiosyncracies of land dictated the
social order. Note the difference in the interests of yeoman farmers and large planters. See
James A. Gardner, Southern Character, Confederate Nationalism, and the Interpretation
of State Constitutions: A Case Study in Constitutional Argument, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1219,
1241 (1998) (noting differences between the planter and yeoman classes) [hereinafter
Gardner, Southern Character]; Jennifer M. Russell, The Race/Class Conundrum and the
Pursuit of Individualism in the Making of Social Policy, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1353, 1397
(1995) (suggesting that the social and economic interests of yeoman fanners and planters
diverged, even if the yeoman farmers did not always act on that divergence). Territory that
could support slavery also supported a social structure in which property rights and
prerogatives had to be vigorously protected. The Civil War was fought primarily over
property and property rights. The theory of states' rights rests in large part on the notion
of a state's primary and autonomous rule over persons and property within the state's
borders. See generally MASON, supra note 73 (discussing Anti-Federalism as the basis for
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land and the uses to which land would be put was extraordinarily important. 135
Consequently, Congress and the federal government were heavily involved in national
issues surrounding property, residence and livelihood. 136 Organizing voting based on
property and land makes sense when a significant portion of voters cares about
property-based or property-related rights.
Given that Congress was heavily invested in the protection of property and
property rights, a congressional districting system based on residence and property
made sense. 137 In the early days of the Union, the federal government was a limited
government 138 whose officia:ts were chosen by property owners largely to protect
property interests. 139 The federal government's limited scope may have affected how
citizens' interests coalesced. When a government's powers are limited, the citizenry's
interests may rationally center around the powers that the government can exercise.
In early America, when protecting property interests was one of the federal
government's primary concerns, citizens' interests, vis-a-vis the government, may
have coalesced around issues related to property interests. 140 The primacy of
property interests in early America made a land and property-based districting system
the theory of states' rights).
13
s See Gardner, Southern Character, supra note 134, at 1243-44 & nn.107-13
(discussing differences between agrarian South and industrial North).
136
Physical property historically has aided in defining communities. This is so, in part,
because life itself has been tied so closely to property and property rights. Both in the state
and national legislatures many rifts can be traced to different ways of life (agrarian vs.
industrial) and different uses for land (agrarian vs. industrial). See THE FEDERALIST No.
60, at 368 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (mentioning the competing
interests in agriculture and industry and opining on how their concerns will be represented
in Congress); see also DONALD B. COLE, THE PRESIDENCY OF ANDREW JACKSON 62-67
(1993) (noting the internal improvements debates of the early 1800s). Nonetheless,
Alexander Hamilton also stressed the interdependence of agriculture and commerce. See
THE FEDERALIST NO. 12, at 91-92 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
137
Congress had other functions, but this one was very important to the Framers. See
ELY, supra note 8, at 26 (arguing generally that the protection of property was very
important to the colonists in the Revolutionary War era); Mark A. Graber, Desperately
Ducking Sltivery: Dred Scott and Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 14 CONST. COMM.
271, 302 (1997) (noting that "the national government had been given extensive power to
protect property").
138
See ELY, supra note 8, at 26 ("[T]he protection of property ownership was an integral
part of the American effort to fashion constitutional limits on governmental authority.").
However, the federal government has the constitutional authority to control a vast amount
of the nation's functions. See U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8.
139
Historically, property has been important to American government. See ELY; supra
note 8, at 160 ("The Constitution and Bill of Rights affirmed the central place of property
ownership in American society.").
14
° Conversely, when government's powers are broad, there may not be a primary
organizing principle around which to coalesce. Consequently, communities of political
interest will coalesce around whatever interests. are central to those in the community.
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sensible. This Article does not necessarily suggest, however, that the centrality of
property interests dictated that compactness should be the central organizing principle
of congressional districting or that the primacy of property rights has continued to
drive the congressional districting system. Rather, it suggests that districting systems
based on property and compactness have been historically sensible, even if they did
not perfectly reflect the political interests of the constituencies thereby created. 141 Of
course, one could suggest that districting created a political system that supported
property rights.
Not only was government for the propertied, but so was voting. 142 Property
interests drove political interests; political theory drove voting restrictions.
Consequently, voting restrictions in the late 1700s and early 1800s may have created
the context in which voters' political interests were necessarily property-based. Most
of the voters at the time were property owners. 143 Many of the interests of the
propertied vis-a-vis the government were likely related to property, that is, either
related to obtaining more property or protecting what property they had. Thus, the
issues around which the enfranchised coalesced might have been related to property
and geography. When non-propertied men, women, blacks, and immigrants were
excluded from the electorate, those who voted may have had similar views of
government as their neighbors-the surrounding land and property holders. 144 These

141

As the country has moved from agrarian to industrial to post-industrial, land has
become less a source of wealth and livelihood and more the place where one lives. Now that
real property and its location are less central to the interests of voters today than when the
compact, land-based districting system was first imposed, the political benefits of that
system must be reexamined. Even though the place where people live certainly correlates
with some demographics, such as wealth, our coalescing interests likely have more to do
with the demographic factor than with the fact that we live in a certain place. Put
differently, the fact that someone lives in an upscale suburban neighborhood may suggest
that she and her neighbors have common political concerns. However, those concerns are
likely less related to the fact that her suburban neighborhood is located in the southeastern
portion of the state than they would be if she and her neighbors farmed the land for their
livelihood.
142
See ELY, supra note 8, at 47.
[T]he Constitution allowed the states to determine the qualifications for voting.
When the Constitution was written, virtually every state imposed a property or
taxpaying qualification on suffrage and set higher property qualifications to
hold public office. The Framers in effect accepted such state-imposed criteria
for participation in national elections. They failed to foresee the rapid
emergence of universal manhood suffrage in the early nineteenth century, a
move that would upset their calculations.
/d.
143
See id
144
See V. 0. KEY, JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION 489 {1949) {"[T]he
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interests would make a system that provided common representation to land-holding
neighbors quite sensible. 145 Given the actual electorate in early America, districting
based on the residence proximity premise may have been quite reasonable.
Not surprisingly, compact, contiguous districting has solid historical roots.
Those roots fit the society in which they were laid. Nonetheless, compact districting
remains sensible in some contexts. Districting provides groups of voters with
common representation. If compact districting actually yields constituencies with
similar interests, it is reasonable. However, as the residence proximity principle
becomes weaker, compactness may merely serve as a tool to aggregate voters
artificially. If residence-based issues do not or should not drive federal legislation
and the democratic process, geographic compactness may make effective
congressional representation more difficult. If political interests no longer center
around property, a voting system freed from compactness may provide better
representation. 146 Such a system could provide constituents common representation
based on their interests rather than the proximity of their residences. 147
2. Redefining Compactness
While some justifications for geographical compactness are fairly strong, they are
also open to criticism. However, much of that criticism could be blunted if the
definition of compactness were broadened. While this Article has used a static
definition of compactness thus far, other viable definitions of compactness can be
theorized. At least two possible visions of compactness, an external one and an
internal one, exist. In addition, each encompasses a number of variations. An
external vision of compactness looks at the shape of the district to determine its
makeup of the body of voting citizens and the way in which they use their franchise
determine, within limits, the character of governing groups and the manner in which they
.exercise their power."). Of course, candidates and elected officials can ignore the interests
of those who do not vote or cannot vote them out of office. See id at 509 ("What classes or
groups do not vote and thereby may be ignored by candidates and perhaps given little
recognition in the actions of government?").
145
Additionally, the issues that divided land-holding voters may have stemmed from
geography. The protection of agrarian or industrial interests was a unifying a1,1d dividing
theme among communities. This division remained strong at least until the 1940s. See id
at 513 (suggesting that rural dwellers have different concerns than city dwellers).
146
For example, proportional representation allows for pure homogeneity of political
culture by allowing those who care deeply about a particular issue to join with others having
similar interests to get specific representation based on that issue in the subject legislature.
See Still, supra note 38, at 358 & n.l3.
147
This might be considered a different style of districting or the elimination of
districting altogether, depending on one's definition of districting. See Butler, supra note
78, at 360 (suggesting that as a district deviates from traditional boundaries, it progressively
ceases to be a real district).
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compactness. This is the conventional view of compactness that the Supreme Court ·
has taken, 148 and it is the version of compactness that informed the analysis above.
Conversely, an internal vision ofcompactness focuses on the voters inside the district
to determine if the constituency is physically close enough to make common
representation sensible. 149 A districting plan based on an external view of
compactness would certainly retain the benefits of compactness mentioned in the
preceding section. Most plans based on an internal vision ofcompactness would also
retain those benefits.
External visions of compactness validate districts that are as regular in shape as
possible. Since round or square districts are not normally possible given geography,
districts that fit smoothly with the natural boundaries and political subdivisions of a
state would comply with an external vision ofcompactness. 150 However, an external
vision of compactness can be much more stifling than flexible. 151 Because
compactness can be defined with mathematical precision, an external vision of
compactness might require the construction of districts in a certain manner so as to
be as compact as possible. 152 That could lead to districts that are as compactly

148

See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993) (listing "compactness, contiguity, and
respect for political subdivisions" as objective districting principles).
149
See Pildes, supra note 88, at 2532 n.1 03.
150
States with odd shapes could have a difficult time creating a set of aesthetically
pleasing districts, even though they cail create a set of districts that are as compact as
possible. See Aleinikoff & lssacharoff, supra note 62, at 6 I 6 (noting the difficulty of
creating compact districts in oddly shaped states such as Maryland (with its eastern shore
and northwest panhandle), Michigan (with its upper peninsula), and West Virginia (with
its double panhandle)).
151
Consider a state that is square-shaped with enough voters for four congressional
districts. If voters are relatively equally dispersed throughout the state, such that a
checkerboard districting plan would make sense, an external vision of compactness might
require that the state's districting plan conform to the checkerboard. Likely, this is not a
problem if the interests of the voters do not suggest a different structure. However, if the
voters wanted to create four districts consisting of strips ofland running east and west from
border to border, a plan based on an external view of compactness might still require the
checkerboard plan unless another traditional districting principle compelled a different
result.
152
Such compactness could be based on some set of mathematical criteria. See Diaz v.
Silver, 978 F. Supp. 96, 114-15 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (detailing mathematical measures of
compactness); Carstens v. Lamm, 543 F. Supp. 68, 87 (D. Colo. 1982) (noting a
mathematical test for compactness); DIXON, supra note I, at 532-33 (noting mathematical
measures of compactness); Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 62, at 62 I (suggesting the
use of objective standards of compactness that would "regiment the redistricting process by
creating a presumption of unconstitutionality whenever there is a significant deviation from
maximum compactness"); Pildes & Niemi, supra note 20, at 553-57 (defining different
ways of measuring the compactness of districts).
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shaped as possible, regardless ofwhether the districts fit natural or political subdivisions.
An extreme application of a mathematically bound definition of compactness
might require the drawing ofdistricts without reference to the political interests ofthe
districts' constituencies or the cohesion that districting often affords. 153 Although a
plan containing only such districts might meet any compactness requirement, it likely
would not provide good representation to the resulting districts because compactness
would be elevated to the exclusion of all other districting interests and principles.
States generally have not used compactness as the sole criterion for districting,
presumably because other interests are important in the districting process. 154
Conversely, an internal vision of compactness bases a district's acceptability on
whether voters inside of a district are physically close enough to one another for the
constituency to be considered compact. 155 The question under such a vision of
compactness is whether the voters inside a district could be appropriately represented
given their physical proximity, regardless of where citizens from adjoining districts
resided. If an affirmative answer yielded a compact district, compactness could be
used to focus on good representation rather than appearances. If an internal vision
of compactness can help construct constituencies that are well-represented, then it
would seem a reasonable principle to use or at least consider when districting. 156
The distinction between an internal and external view of compactness can be
made clear by considering the districting of a hypothetical city that could support
13

s Districts, rather than districting plans, are deemed compact or not compact. However,
the result of having a district declared not compact is that the entire plan may be subjected
to scrutiny. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952,962 (1996) (plurality opinion).
14
s See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (discussing compactness, contiguity, and
respect for political subdivisions as traditional principles and as important factors to
consider in determining if a district has been gerrymandered along racial lines). Though
states do not appear to search for perfectly compact districts and districting schemes,
whether maximally compact districts exist may be important because the constitutionality
of districts is measured, in part, by how much the district deviates from a compact district.
More precisely, the constitutionality of a district is measured by how far the principles on
which it is constructed deviate from traditional districting principles. See supra notes 87-96
and accompanying text. While the Court would not likely require that a district meet any
mathematical measure of compactness, the issue would be whether each district met some
loose definition of compactness. If the prototypical compact district is a perfectly compact
district, the constitutionally allowable deviations from that district would be narrower than
if the prototypical compact district is not a maximally compact district.
Jss See Pildes, supra note 88, at 2532 n.l 03.
1 6
s Some have suggested that the ease of representation should dominate the compactness
inquiry. See Karlan, supra note 41, at 211-12 (suggesting that compactness should hinge
on whether those inside of the district can be effectively represented, rather than "whether
the district has four regular, or twenty-eight uncouth, sides" (citing Dillard v. Baldwin
County Bd. ofEduc., 686 F. Supp. 1459, 1465-66 (M.D. Ala. 1988))); see also Sanchez v.
Colorado, 97 F.3d 1303, 1328-29 (lOth Cir. 1996) (focusing on compactness and cohesion
of those in district rather than the physical compactness of the district).
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multiple districts. Assume that a city has sufficient inhabitants to fill two
congressional districts. A proposed districting plan apportions the city so that one
district contains the poorer neighborhoods in the city and one district contains the
wealthier neighborhoods in the city. Under the plan, each district would contain
neighborhoods from each quadrant of the city because of the dispersion of wealth in
the city. Such a plan would be analyzed differently under an external vision of
compactness than under an internal vision of compactness. An external view of
compactness would deem each district non-compact because several districting plans
could be drawn that would contain more compact districts. Conversely, an internal
view would focus on the voters inside of the district and ask whether voters living
inside ofthe same city live close enough to each other to be adequately represented. 157
While neither district would be as compact as possible, arguably all voters would be
compact in relation to each other because they all live in the same city. 158 This
Article does not suggest that either the external or internal view of compactness
would necessarily validate or invalidate the hypothetical districting plan under
prevailing law. Rather, it suggests that the questions that would be asked and the
process of determining the districts' appropriateness would be different.
How compactness is defined can have serious effects on how a constituency is
defined and ultimately on how well it is represented. An external vision of
compactness can be suffocating. An internal vision allows compactness to serve the
ultimate goal of good representation. While the internal vision of compactness
provides most ofthe benefits of compactness that the external vision ofcompactness
provides, it does not provide all ofthem. However, moving toward an internal vision
of compactness can provide representational benefits that an external vision of
. compactness cannot. Indeed, as the hypothetical suggests, in densely populated areas
the internal vision ofcompactness can provide all ofthe geography-based benefits of
external compactness and some extra representational benefits. The next question is
whether a departure from all visions of compactness toward a system that only
considers the political interests ofvoters could provide even greater representational
benefits.
IV. INTEREST-BASED DISTRICTING

The congressional voting system is based on providing common representation

157

See Pildes, supra note 88, at 2531-32 (discussing compactness as related to the
interests of those inside of a district).
158
This definition allows nearly any district that lies almost solely within a metropolitan
area, such as the 18th Congressional District of Texas at issue in Bush v. Vera, to be
deemed compact. See Bush, 517 U.S. at 952; see also Pildes & Niemi, supra note 20, at
548-51 (suggesting that a district's compactness depends on one's definition of
compactness).
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to people who have been grouped as constituencies. If that representation is to be as
effective as possible, states should group voters in a way that allows them to advance
their political interests through elections. Creating cohesive constituencies with the
ability to elect legislators who most probably represent their interests would be the
easiest way to realize that goal. Focusing explicitly on shared political interests as
a basis for creating constituencies is one way to reach that goal. While the solution
sounds simple, implementing it could result in a radical restructuring of the current
voting system.
The historical focus on compactness and contiguousness has resulted in neighbors
enjoying common representation. 159 While these principles can guide the construction
of effectively represented districts, they may not serve the goal of effective
representation as well as they have historically .160 The conditions that made property
and residence good indicators of shared interests are no longer as common as they
used to be. 161 If geographical proximity is no longer a sufficient proxy for shared
political interests, focusing exclusively on shared political interests to the exclusion
of geography can provide a reasonable basis for districting. Indeed, districting based
on shared political interests is an accepted, though rarely determinative, districting
method. 162 Although courts have made shared political interests a secondary
districting principle, 163 districting based primarily on shared political interests may
159

Outside of the congressional context, the residence proximity premise may hold in
many situations, particularly as the issues addressed by the subject legislature or council
become more local. Local decisions will tend to affect land and interests intimately tied to
land more often than national decisions. But see Sargentich, supra note 68, at 135 n.245
(noting the wisdom former Speaker of the House Tip O'Neill received from his father, "All
politics is local."). Of course, the residence proximity premise likely holds when Congress
handles inherently local issues, such as appropriations for specific local purposes. The
residence proximity premise grows stronger as the body involved becomes more local
because localities are more likely to be neatly segregated by interests than congressional
districts. Self-segregation creates a context in which the residence proximity premise is
valid. However, with respect to the national issues that Congress manages, the residence
proximity premise weakens.
160
Some have suggested that geography-based districting is no longer compatible with
the representation of group interests. See Pildes & Niemi, supra note 20, at 535
("[C]ompactness is the conceptual point at which the tension between the traditional
American commitment to territorial districting and the [Voting Rights Act] concern for fair
representation of group interests must be resolved.").
161
See supra notes 127-47 and accompanying text.
162
See Sanchez v. Colorado, 97 F.3d 1303, 1306-07 (lOth Cir. 1996)(using preservation
of communities of interest as a districting principle).
163
Courts appear reluctant to endorse the use of shared political interests as a primary
districting criteria, possibly because of the potential for communities of interest to track
racial identity too closely. See Silver v. Diaz, 978 F. Supp. 96, 99-101 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)
(questioning Latino political cohesion in New York City); Moon v. Meadows, 952 F. Supp.
1141, 1145-46 (E.D.Va. 1997) (suggesting that the aggregation of areas populated by
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effectuate optimal representation, because combining voters based on their common
political interests facilitates the advancement of the constituency's agenda. Interestbased districting focuses on representation rather than geography and can lead to
homogeneous, easily represented districts. 164 When geography was a proxy for
political interest, geography-based and interest-based districting were the same. 165
They no longer are. 166
A geography-based, interest-influenced system is very different from an interestbased, geography-influenced system. Depending on the hierarchy of principles, a
district that could be acceptable under one hierarchy could be highly problematic
under the other. The issue is the hierarchy ofvalues. Geography-based districting
and interest-based districting can reflect different values. 167 Those values can clash
when states create congressional districts. 168
Consider this hypothetical districting scenario. A state, which has six members
of Congress, designates areas of the state as urban, suburban, and rural for districting
African-Americans in southeastern Virginia into a district is racial gerrymandering).
164
See Sanchez 97 F.3d at 1308 (recognizing the role of communities of interest in
facilitating political representation in the districting process).
165
See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
166
Interest-based districting can be viewed as a break from traditional principles if
geography-based districting is viewed as a traditional principle. Conversely, geographybased districting can be viewed as a special form of interest-based districting that focuses
on physical proximity. See GUINIER, supra note 56, at 127 (noting that geographical
districts have been viewed as somewhat interest-based). But see Aleinikoff & lssacharoff,
supra note 62, at 637 (disputing the notion that geography tracks interests). The current
system can be viewed as merely derivative of the English districting system. The English
system was based on land, rather than the political interests of the district's inhabitants. See
GUINIER, supra note 56, at 127-28 (explaining the British antecedents to American
. districting). Conversely, the current congressional system is based on individual interests.
The one-person, one-vote doctrine makes little sense unless an individual's vote is what
matters. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 559 (1964). Whether interest-based or
geography-based districting is viewed as the appropriate template matters, because
deviations from traditional districting principles can lead to a districting plan's
invalidation. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952,980-81 (1996).
The foregoing should not be interpreted to suggest that interest-based districting is
required by the Constitution, as the Constitution does not require any type of districting at
all. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text. Rather, interest-based districting is
consistent with a vision of representation that existed at the time of the nation's founding,
and still exists.
167
See Pildes, supra note 88, at 2536 ("By organizing elections around geographic
districts, we seek to make representation tum on geographically defined concerns. With the
Voting Rights Act, we seek to define representation in terms of the political interests of
specific groups, such as protected minorities.").
168
See id ("We are currently trying to wedge the concerns of an interest-based approach
into a geographically based system; at some point, the tension between the two reaches a
breaking point.").

1999]

ENCLAVE DISTRICTING

175

purposes. The state has two major cities, each capable of supporting a congressional
district. Each city is surrounded by a suburban ring that also has a sufficient
population to support a congressional district. A river running east to west bisects
the state and the state's population is distributed such that each half of the state can
support three districts.
The state decides that its first district will include every citizen who lives in the
river's 100-year flood plain. Assume that district encompasses everyone living within
five miles of the river which runs the length of the state. Because of the state's
population dispersion, creating five other districts of equal population consisting of
contiguous territory will be· impossible. However, creating five districts with
reasonably cohesive constituencies is possible. To do so, the state draws two urban
districts with each city constituting a district, two suburban districts drawn in
concentric circles surrounding the urban districts, and one district consisting of the
remaining statewide rural populations. The characteristics of the districts are as
follows: District I (the flood plain district), District 2 (urban district north of the
river), District 3 (suburban district north of the river), District 4 (urban district south
of the river), District 5 (suburban district south of the river), and District 6
(statewide, non-flood plain rural district).
From an interest-based perspective, there is little problem with the plan. The
voters in District 1 (the flood plain district) have common interests in congressional
legislation related to flood relief, levee flood control, wetlands regulation,
environmental protection, and river-related commerce. Constructing a flood plain
district is sensible if the shared political interests of the district's voters matter.
Likewise, the urban, suburban, and rural districts make sense because Congress has
legislated and likely will continue to legislate in ways that uniquely affect urban,
suburban and rural areas. 169 Placing these populations in these six districts is
sensible, even if the District 6 voters have a statewide district, while the urban voters
have a citywide district. While the rural voters and the candidates who vie to
represent them will be burdened geographically, voters' interests may be better served
by a representative chosen from this districtthan by a representative chosen from any
other compact district that might be created. Whether the rural voters would prefer
to be in a statewide district or one that consisted of some urban, some suburban, and
some rural territory is unclear, particularly ifthe urbanites and suburbanites could
outvote them.
Conversely, this plan is highly problematic if compactness and contiguousness
remain important districting principles. 170 Both principles have been ignored in this

169
170

See supra note 124 and accompanying text.

This is not to suggest that the hypothetical plan would be invalidated under existing
districting theories. Rather, it suggests that different questions must be asked and answered
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plan. 171 As traditionally understood, compactness suggests thatthose who live closer
to each other have more common interests than those who Iive farther away from each
other. According to this theory, a District 6 voter who lives south ofDistrict 5 should
be more readily grouped with voters south of the river in Districts 4 or 5 than with
District 6 voters Jiving north ofthe river. Of course, District 6 is as compact as it can
be, given that rural voters not living in the flood plain are only sufficiently numerous
to comprise one district. However, neither District 6 nor the overall districting plan
is as compact as they could be. The river's positioning and the state's population
dispersion combine to make a more compact apportionment relatively easy to achieve.
This districting scheme has more severe problems with respectto contiguousness.
District 6 is not contiguous. Once District 1 is created, non-contiguousness is
inescapable because population sufficient to create two and one-half districts exists
both north and south of the river. Districts consisting of non-contiguous territory
strike at the heart of what a geography-based system is. If such districts are allowed,
the term "geography-based" may mean nothing more than that districts need to be tied
to land. Of course, that is the essence of placing interest-based districting above
geography-based districting. It is also the essence of enclave districting.

V.

ENCLAVE DISTRICTING

Enclave districting is an unabashed interest-based districting system. It defines
geographical enclaves based on demographic criteria that are relevant to electing
members of Congress, then aggregates them into districts. Each state legislature
would use whatever set of demographic criteria it believed important to electing its
congressional delegation when defining enclaves and constructing districts. 172
Enclave districting rests on the premise that defining enclaves with similar
demographic characteristics and aggregating them into congressional districts can
provide better representation than districting based solely on aggregating compact and
contiguous areas of land.

in different ways depending on the hierarchy of districting principles courts adopt.
171
That a plan contains a non-contiguous district wiii not necessarily invalidate it. See
Diilard v. Town of Louisville, 730 F. Supp. 1546,.1549-50 (M.D.Ala. 1990) (approving a
districting plan that included non-contiguous district); Polsby & Popper, Third Criterion,
supra note 84, 330 ("[T]he Supreme Court has never said that a district must be composed
of contiguous areas.").
172
Enclave districting provides states with options regarding how to district. While it
may seem strange that a scheme that seeks to enhance representation for voters would still
be controlled a priori by the state, if one is going to have districts, some entity must control
how the district lines are drawn. Consequently, enclave districting allows state legislatures
to create districts along whatever political interest lines the state deems appropriate. Of
course, the process to determine what interests are important will include input from a
state's citizens.
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Enclave districting accepts that while the residence proximity principle may be
accurate on a small scale, it becomes less so on a larger scale. Neighborhoods should
have common representation for practical reasons and because neighbors often have
similar political interests on issues about which Congress legislates. However, when
the neighborhood is expanded to the size of a congressional district encompassing
more than 500,000 people, there is little reason to provide the entire area with
common representation based solely on geographical proximity. 173 As a result,
enclave districting is most relevant to large legislative districts, such as congressional
districts.
In its mildest form, enclave districting encourages departures from compactness
and contiguousness when appropriate. The hypothetical flood plain district in Part
IV evinces a relatively subdued form of enclave districting. At its most radical,
enclave districting would be limited only by the imagination of state legislatures, the
Constitution, and voting rights laws. 174 The set of demographic criteria a state uses
to create enclaves could be based upon almost any factor that a state legislature
deemed relevant to congressional representation. A state could create enclaves based
primarily on income and secondarily on geography, resulting in a congressional
district centered around middle class neighborhoods in the southwestern portion of a
state. Similarly, a state could create enclaves based on·the population of its cities,
resulting in a congressional district consisting of cities of 50,000 to 75,000 people.
The choices are almost limitless. However, the point ofthis Article is not to suggest
what demographic criteria are appropriate or inappropriate bases for creating
districts; rather, it is to suggest that states can and should group voters based on some
vision of the demographic characteristics that are important to its citizens and to the
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With 435 members of the House of Representatives and over 248 million people in
the United States, the average congressional district encompasses more than 500,000
people. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, 1990 DECENNIAL
CENSUS.
174
See U.S. CONST. amends. XIV,§§ 1 & 2, XV,§§ 1 & 2; Voting Rights Act of 1965,
42 U.S.C. § 1973 et seq. (1994). Enclave districting may not be as radical as it sounds.
Enclave districting can be likened to reverse virtual representation. Virtual representation
suggests that a constituency not be given specific representation if voters in other areas of
the subject jurisdiction have elected representatives who can adequately represent the
interests of the unrepresented constituency. See BIRCH, supra note 2, at 51-52 (explaining
virtual representation); GUINIER, supra note 56, at 130-31 (discussing virtual
representation). Thus, industrial areas may·not need a representative dedicated to their
cause because other industrial areas have elected representatives who can protect the
interests of those living in industrial areas. However, instead of suggesting that the
industrial areas should be content without a representative, enclave districting suggests that
the far-flung industrial areas should be combined so that voters in all industrial areas can
have some input in choosing a legislator who may represent their interests.
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state when electing members of Congress. 175 Enclave districting provides that
flexibility.
This raises the question of why states should not adopt at-large voting schemes.
Since any form of districting compels voters to join with other voters who may not
share their political vision, some form of non-districted voting would seem to provide
the greatest opportunity for voters to vote based on their political interests.
Therefore, the most appropriate vehicle to provide voters the greatest autonomy
would seem to be a modified at-large or proportional representation system that is
completely free from geography. While there are numerous reasons to avoid at-large
and proportional representation systems, the most salient, for the purposes of this
Article, is that such a system would not allow the real or perceived relationship
between a representative and her constituency to flourish. 176 That relationship,
mentioned in Part II, facilitates the ability of the representative to represent her
constituency and allows the constituency to hold the representative accountable for
her actions.
Under non-districted systems, voters cannot be certain who champions their
interests (i.e,. who is their representative), and representatives cannot be certain
whose interests to champion (i.e., who are their constituents). Functionally, every
representative represents every voter, and every voter is represented by every
representative in a non-districted system. That relationship can hardly be considered
superior in all respects to one formed in a single-member district system. The loss
ofthe representative-constituent relationship would render focused representation a
matter of chance rather than a matter of principle. While voters generally may know
how a representative stands on issues, there would be little opportunity to shape the
representative's views precisely because there would be little targeted accountability
for the representative's actions. That no obvious constituency would exist to punish
a representative for poor representation suggests that an at-large representative might
court any group of voters in order to remain in office, rather.than focus on those
voters who elected him. While a representative might attempt to represent his
perceived constituency, whether the perceived constituency actually was his
constituency would always be an uncertainty because no method would exist to
identify members of an at-large constituency other than opportunistic self-reporting,
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Of course, some may suggest that this proposal would allow race-based districting.
Enclave districting would allow race-based districting to the extent that such districting
would seek to combine relevantly similar enclaves that could not be aggregated into districts
if districts were limited by compactness analysis, and to the extent that such districting is
currently allowed by the Voting Rights Act. However, enclave districting is a reasonable
method of districting whether the law allows race-based districting or not.
176
See supra notes 45-62 and accompanying text (describing the importance of the
constituent-representative relationship).
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in the form of saying, "I voted for you." 177 Simply, the relationship between a
representative and her constituency that is created by a districting system is too
important to sacrifice, given that enclave districting creates an option that retains the
relationship. Because that relationship is available only in a districted system, a
non-districted system would not be an appropriate solution. 178 Rather, the
appropriate solution is an interest-based districting system.
Enclave districting is a form of interest-based districting, that appears to be very
similar to districting based on communities of interest. However, two important
distinctions between enclaves and communities of interest exist. Communities of
interest are self-identifying and, of necessity, large. Enclaves are defined by
legislatures and can be relatively small. Communities of interests are defined by their
members and based in large part on the political objectives that community members
want to gain from the legislature. 179 While a community of interest is shaped by
outside forces, those inside of the community and those wishing to be inside of the
community ultimately define it subjectively.
Districting based on communities of interest can be considered the logical
terminus of interest-based districting precisely because it allows those inside of the
community to define the terms of their representation. 180 However, in the political
context, this can provide an incentive for those inside of the community to define the
community as broadly as necessary, to validate the claim that the community be
allowed to choose a representative to champion the community's interests. Since
177

Of course, self-reporting has its own drawbacks. A legislator could find herself with
many more putative supporters than she had votes.
178
There are situations in which other structural problems in the voting system are so
severe that using a non-districted scheme to fix them in the short-run might be more
important than maintaining the relationship between a representative and her constituency.
One case might be when a minority group is unable to elect anyone to represent their
interests without a stylized voting scheme.
179
See Diaz v. Silver, 978 F. Supp. 96, 124 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) ("Common employment,
services, religion, economy, country of origin and culture are more relevant in determining
whether a community of interest exists."); Scott v. United States Dep't of Justice, 920 F.
Supp. 1248, 1254 (M.D. Fla. 1996), aff'd 521 U.S. 567 (1996) ("Viewed optimistically, a
community is definable as individuals who sense among themselves a cohesiveness that
they regard as prevailing over their cohesiveness with others. This cohesiveness may arise
from numerous sources, both manifest and obscure, that include geography ... , history,
tradition, religion, race, ethnicity, economics, and every other conceivable combination of
chance, circumstance, time, and place."); JOSEPH TUSSMAN, GOVERNMENT AND THE MIND
9 (1977) ("A community is constituted by-its very existence depends upon-a condition
or state of mind. It is not a mere collection of physical entities or a herd of biological
organisms. It is a continuing organization of persons related by shared understandings,
commitments, agreements, attitudes.").
180
See GUINIER, supra note 56, at 137 (suggesting that voters should have "the
opportunity to make their own local choices about the nature and salience of their
interests").
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communities of interest are often constructed in the context ofseeking representation,
they necessarily need to be large enough to command a majority in a congressional
district. That communities of interest need to be large may encourage community
members to define the community based less on shared interests and more on a desire
for representation. 181 While there is nothing inherently sinister about communities of
interest, that they are the linchpin to claims of representation puts pressure on people
to create them where they may not exist and define them in a way that ultimately may
not advance the interests of the now large community of interest.
No similar pressure exists in enclave districting. Enclaves are rooted in
neighborhoods and are not necessarily any larger than a broadly defined
neighborhood. 182 An enclave is defined by a set of demographic criteria constructed
by a body outside of the enclave. Additionally, since enclaves can be much smaller
than congressional districts, they are unlikely to be defined merely to create a singleenclave district. While this does not necessarily make enclaves superior to
communities of interest, it lessens the temptation to expand the demographic factors
defining an enclave to increase its size. This is not to say that enclaves will never
resemble communities of interest. In some situations, a community of interest may
be an enclave. Indeed, groups might attempt to structure their communities of interest
as enclaves hoping that the community would appear cohesive enough to become the
core of a congressional district. Depending on the demographic criteria used by a
state to define enclaves, this strategy might be successful. Nevertheless, enclaves and
communities of interest are conceptually distinct and serve different purposes.
Enclave districting is subject to criticism. The most salient criticisms are that
enclave districting invites gerrymandering, can yield unwieldy statewide districts, and
invites balkanization. That enclave districting tolerates gerrymandering is true. 183
Enclave districting allows districts to be finely constructed based representation based
on the political interests of voters. That is the trade-off, one that states have always
made and likely will continue to make.
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See Diaz, 978 F. Supp. at 99-101 (suggesting that an interest group incorrectly
suggested a cohesion among Latinos in New York that did not exist). Of course, Thornberg
v. Gingles requires that any group seeking representation be large enough to control a
district before any harm to the community's voting rights exists. See Thornburg v. Gingles,
478 U.S. 30, 50 (1986) ("First, the minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is
sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member
district.").
182
In referring to a neighborhood, this Article does not mean to suggest any particular
definition of a neighborhood. Rather, it intends to suggest that a neighborhood is one where
most residents are joined by common political concerns merely because of the proximity of
their residences. In that vein, a neighborhood can be relatively small or quite large.
183
See Karlan & Levinson, supra note 6, at 1209 n.37 (asserting all districting plans
consider and tolerate racial classifications).
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While not mandating statewide districts, enclave districting allows their creation.
Statewide districts are not inherently undesirable. 184 Whether statewide districting is
a problem depends on how important compactness is to the state. If widely dispersed
districts are anathema to a state, geographic location likely would become a delimiter
that the state would use in creating districts. States could require that all district
enclaves be in a particular region of a state or that district enclaves be within a circle
of prescribed radius. Conversely, states not troubled by statewide districts could
create some number of them. Flexibility in apportionment is the key to and greatest
strength of enclave districting.
Enclave districting creates districts populated by people with similar political
concerns. For example, a districtfull of farmers will likely care about farming issues.
Such a district likely will be more oriented to farm issues than a district populated by
urban city dwellers. If combining people based on political interest is synonymous
with balkanization, enclave districting leads to balkanization. However, the current
political system is focused on combining people with similar political concerns,
however imperfectly it completes the task. If this is so, any scheme that helps the
current system achieve its goal of reasonably effective representation may move
society toward balkanization. Thus, the criticism is undoubtedly a valid one, but one
that must be directed at a political system that seeks to provide common
representation to those with common interests, not at a scheme that seeks to help the
system reach that goal.
Enclave districting allows similar areas to have common representation and
affords different representation to dissimilar areas without regard to geographic
proximity. Unsurprisingly, enclave districting has its greatest application in
situations where neighborhoods are physically close but demographically distant.
When the physical proximity of neighborhoods is uncorrelated with political
closeness, 185 providing common representation to both neighborhoods may be
traditional, but may not serve the representational interests of either neighborhood ..
If a state containing such physically close but politically distant neighborhoods
believes that the neighborhoods should have common representation, providing
common representation may make sense regardless of their lack of geographical
proximity. Similarly, if the state finds that the two neighborhoods should not have
common representation, separating them into different districts makes sense
regardless of their proximity.
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This Article certainly does not denigrate those states that have a lone member of the
House of Representatives: Alaska, Delaware, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota,
Vermont, and Wyoming. See Robin H. Carle, Clerk of the House of Representatives,
Official Alphabetical List of the House of Representatives of the United States (1998);
Pildes & Donoghue, supra note 1, at 251-52 n.43.
185
See Ford, supra note 81, at 1407 (stating geography is one factor for consideration,
but is not wholly determinative of the political actions and affiliations of individuals).
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Although they appear different, attheircores, enclave and compact districting are ·
not so different. Compact districting assumes similarity of political interests along
a geographical axis, then endorses it through compactness. Enclave districting
assumes similarity of political interests along a axis, then endorses it. Enclave
districting is a single-member, geography-influenced, interest-based districting
system. It fosters the representation and accountability that single-memberdistricting
provides while encouraging interest-based representation that better protects the
political interests of voters. While enclave districting may be subject to
gerrymandering, such gerrymandering is structured along representational lines that
still make sense. States should consider adopting enclave districting because it can
provide better representation for voters, while allowing states to structure the
districting process along lines they deem proper.
CONCLUSION

Enclave districting permits voters to elect representatives who will advance and
protect their interests by grouping voters who live in similar neighborhoods under
common representation, rather than aggregating voters who merely live in
neighborhoods that are physically close. By disconnecting the voting system from
compactness and contiguousness, enclave districting allows representatives to better
represent their constituents through an interest-based system that focuses on voters'
interests rather than parcels of land. However, by maintaining single-member
districts, enclave districting also allows the possibility of a strong relationship
between a representative and her constituents through which the representative will
be accountable to her constituents. Consequently, enclave districting allows states
the freedom to construct districts in a way that is most likely to provide good
representation to their citizens.

